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Both before and since its promulgation in 1952, the Uniform Com-
mercial Code has been the subject of voluminous comment in the legal
periodicals.' Article 7 of the Code deals comprehensively with docu-
ments of title; it is designed to replace the Uniform Warehouse Receipts
Act,' the Uniform Bills of Lading Act,3 and Sections 27-40 of the Uni-
form Sales Act.4 The subject is one of great importance, and the
changes made by the Code are significant; yet there has been sur-
prisingly little comment on Article 7.' Perhaps the most useful com-
ments are to be found in annotations to the Code prepared for use in
various individual states.'
t Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Valuable help in the preparation of
this Article was given by J. Asa Rountree, a member of the third year class, Harvard
Law School.
1. See, e.g., the following symposia: 16 LAw & CoNT=MP. PRoij. 1 (1951);
[1952] Wis. L. REv. 197; 22 TENN. L. REV. 776 (1953) ; 14 Ouio ST. L.J. 1 (1953).
2. Hereinafter UWRA. The Act was promulgated in 1906 and has been en-
acted in every state. See 3 UNIFOa LAWS ANN.; Pa. Laws 1909, No. 13, p. 19,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, §§23-32, 131-180 (Purdon 1930). See also 4 WILLIsTON,
CONTRACTS c. 35 (Rev. ed. 1936); MOHUX, WAREHOUSE LAws AND DECISIoNS (2d
ed. 1914).
3. Hereinafter UBLA. The Act was promulgated in 1909 and has been enacted
in 31 states. See 4 UNIFORMa LAws ANN.; Pa. Laws 1911, p. 838, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 6, §§ 51-105 (Purdon 1930). See also 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACtS c. 36 (Rev. ed.
1936).
4. Hereinafter USA. The Act was promulgated in 1906 and has been enacted
in 34 states. See 1 UNIFORM LAws ANN.; Pa. Laws 1915, No. 241, p. 543, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 1-339 (Purdon 1931). See WILLISTON, SALES (Rev. ed. 1948).
5. See Pryor, Article 7-Documents of Title; An Attempt at Commercial Uni-
formity, [1952] Wis. L. REV. 332; Note, 44 ILL. L. REV. 100 (1949); Comment, 17
ALBANY L. REy. 111 (1953); Comment, 31 TExAs L. REV. 167 (1952); Comment,
32 TExAs L. REV. 321 (1954).
6. See PENNSYLVANIA ANNOTATIONS TO THE PROPOSED UNIFORM CoMMCIALc.
CODE (1952); MASSAcHuSrTS ANNOTATIONS TO THE PROPOSED UNIFORM CoM-
ImERcui. CODE (1953).
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The enactment of the Code in Pennsylvania,7 effective July 1, 1954,
brought the subject out of the realm of academic discussion and into
that of the practice of law. Early in 1954 a series of forums on the
Code was presented in Philadelphia under the joint auspices of the
Philadelphia and American Bar Associations and the Committee on
Continuing Legal Education of the American Law Institute. This
article is based on one of the lectures given in that series, but is less
heavily focussed on the specific changes made in preexisting Pennsyl-
vania law.
I. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE
Statutes Repealed: In enacting the Uniform Commercial Code, the
Pennsylvania legislature not only repealed the three uniform acts re-
ferred to above, but also repealed statutes relating to liens and their
enforcement to the extent of any inconsistency,8 or to the extent they
related to warehousemen and carriers.9 The general scope of Article 7
is very similar to that of the statutes repealed, except -that the Code
makes no provision for criminal penalties. In Pennsylvania criminal
provisions substantially similar to those found in the Uniform Ware-
house Receipts Act and Uniform Bills of Lading Act were separately
enacted as additions to the Penal Code of 1939.0
Major Changes: The Code makes a large number of changes in
terminology and in detail; this article treats those changes which seem
to have the greatest significance. Here it is enough to list the out-
standing novelties. First is a requirement of filing to validate field-
warehousing arrangements. Second is a major change in the control
of goods shipped under a straight bill of lading, relating to diversion
and reconsignment. Third are novel provisions governing delivery
orders. And fourth are provisions for bills of lading issued by freight
forwarders, air bills of lading, destination bills of lading, and through
bills of lading.
7. Pa. Laws 1953, No. 1, p. 3, as amended by Pa. Laws 1953, No 180, p. 624.
See also Pa. Laws 1953, No. 304, p. 1110, amending the penal laws.
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 10-102 (Purdon 1953), repealing Pa. Laws 1925,
No. 300, p. 557, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, §§ 11-4 (Purdon 1930); PA. LAWS 1927,
No. 52, p. 73, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, §§ 511-3 (Purdon 1930). Unless otherwise
indicated, citations to the UCC herein refer to the Official Draft of the Uniform
Commercial Code as proposed by the American Law Institute and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws, Text and Comments Edition (1952),
with changes recommended by the Editorial Board in a pamphlet dated April 30,
1953, as reprinted in BRAUCHER, SUTHERLAND & WILLCOX, COMMERCIAL TRANSAC-
TIONS: TExT-FoRMs-STATUTES (1953). The Pennsylvania text is identical except
with rC ' Qct to certain sections proposed in the alternative in the Official Draft, and
with respect to the list of statutes repealed.
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 10-102 (Purdon 1953), repealing Pa. Laws 1864,
No. 965, p. 1127, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, §§ 15-7 (Purdon 1930).
10. Compare UWRA §§ 50-5, UBLA §§ 44-50, with PA. LAWS 1953, No. 304,
p. 1110, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4851.1 (Purdon Supp. 1953).
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Statutes Not Affected: Important statutes closely related to the
subject matter of Article 7 are unaffected. First, state enactment of
the Code cannot change overriding federal statutes. The United States
Warehouse Act,11 the Interstate Commerce Act, 2 and the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act 13 regulate important aspects of warehousing and
transportation. More directly in point is the Federal Bills of Lading
Act, 4 for the most part identical with the Uniform Bills of Lading Act,
but covering interstate shipments and foreign exports. Unless that Act
is amended by Congress, the law for interstate shipments will not be
uniform with the law embodied in Article 7.15 State "regulatory stat-
utes" and tariffs, classifications or regulations thereunder are similarly
unaffected.-'
"Document of Title": The term "document of title," basic to the
coverage of Article 7, is defined in Article 1.17 It includes specifically
bills of lading- and warehouse receipts, which are separately defined. In
the traditional concept, a bill of lading or warehouse receipt has three
aspects: it is (1) a receipt for goods delivered to the issuer, (2) a con-
tract between the issuer and the owner, and (3) a document of title.
As a receipt, the document identifies the goods and is evidence against
the issuer, although recitals of fact are ordinarily not subject to the
parol evidence rule and may be contradicted by other evidence. The
Code makes such a document, if a contract authorizes or requires its
issuance by a third party, "prima facie evidence" between the contract-
ing parties "of its own authenticity and genuineness and of the facts
stated in the document by the third party." "8 As a contract, the docu-
ment may contain terms defining the issuer's obligation; in this aspect,
the parol evidence rule may deny effect to agreements varying its legal
effect."
11. 39 STAT. 486 (1916), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§241-73 (1946) ; Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). See Blomquist, Warehouse Regulatiom
Since Munn v. Illinois, 29 CHI-KENT Rv. 120 (1951).
12. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1946) (Note especially
the Carmack Amendment, 34 STAT. 593 (1906)); Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. v. Harold,
241 U.S. 371 (1916).
13. 49 STAT. 1207 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1946).
14. Hereinafter FBLA. 39 STAT. 538 (1916), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§81-124
(1946). See Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209 (1931).
15. See, generally, Braucher, Federal Enactment of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 16 LAW & CONTEmP. PRos. 100 (1951).
16. UCC § 7-103. See, e.g., Pa. Laws 1949, No. 455, p. 1511, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 31, §§ 962-76 (Purdon Supp. 1953) (Cold Storage Act); Pa. Laws 1937, No.
286, p. 1053, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, §§ 1101-562 (Purdon Supp. 1953)
(Public Utility Law).
17. UCC §1-201(15), following USA §76; UCC §7-102(1)(e).
18. UCC §1-202.
19. Compare UCC §§ 1-205, 2-202.
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These first two aspects are not peculiar to documents of title.
Under the Code a document of title must be treated "in the current
course of business or financing . . . as adequately evidencing that
the person in possession of it is entitled to receive, hold and dispose of
the document and the goods it covers." 20 It "must purport to be issued
by or addressed to a bailee and purport to cover goods in the bailee's
possession which are either identified or are fungible portions of an
identified mass." 21 Delivery orders are expressly included,22 as are
dock warrants and dock receipts; other documents are covered if they
meet the standards quoted. The official comment indicates that the
specified types of documents must also meet those standards, and that
dock warrants or dock receipts often will not do so.2" The comment
also excludes conditional sale contracts and "tokens" of storage such as
baggage and parcel checks.
Conflict of Laws: Except where federal law interferes, the geo-
graphical scope of Article 7 is laid down in Article 12 The con-
troversial provisions of Section 1-105 make Article 7 applicable when-
ever any transaction within its terms or the terms of Article 2 (Sales)
or Article 5 (Documentary Letters of Credit) has any one of several
listed types of contact with the enacting state. But the parties may
agree to be governed by the law of some other state or nation to which
the transaction "bears a reasonable relationship."
Those provisions now constitute a directive to the courts of Penn-
sylvania to apply the Code in many situations where common-law prin-
ciples of the conflict of laws would point to the law of some other state.
While judicial dicta can be found that in some situations such a change
in conflict-of-laws principles is beyond the legislative power,' there are
analogous precedents for the Code provisions.2" Parties to transactions
which may give rise to litigation in Pennsylvania, therefore, must take
20. UCC § 1-201(15).
21. Ibid.
22. See also UCC §§7-102(1) (d), (f), 7-502(1), (2).
23. UCC § 1-201, comment 15.
24. UCC § 1-105(2), (6) ; see Dean, Conflict of Laws under the Uniform Com-
nercial Code: The Case for Federal Enactment, 6 VAND. L. REv. 479 (1953);
Stumberg, Commercial Paper and the Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REv. 489, 49 -
504 (1953).
25. See Roland M. Baker Co. v. Brown, 214 Mass. 196, 202, 100 N.E. 1025,
1027 (1913) (obligations of carrier under import bill of lading). But cf. Voghel
v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 216 Mass. 165, 103 N.E. 286 (1913) (rights against
local connecting carrier) ; Hallgarten v. Oldham, 135 Mass. 1 (1883) (indorsement
elsewhere of Massachusetts warehouse receipt).
26. Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403, 408 (1927) (usury:
validating law applied unless place "has no normal relation to the transaction");
see Note, 62 Hav. L. REv. 647 (1949) (contract stipulations).
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account of the provisions of the Code, even though traditional prin-
ciples would make Pennsylvania law inapplicable.
The principal cases under Article 7 where the Code may make
Pennsylvania law newly applicable will involve warehouse receipts and
bills of lading, either intrastate or foreign, issued elsewhere. But the
Code is a direct command only to the courts, including the federal
courts,217 in Pennsylvania. If litigation arises in another state, the ap-
plication of the Code depends in the first instance on the choice-of-law
rule of the forum state.2 The result is to make the applicable law
depend, more clearly than before, on the choice of forum, and thus to
encourage selection of the place of suit on that basis.
The Commercial Setting: Most shipments of goods today are made
under bills of lading. The greatest volume, nearly one-and-one-half
billion tons per year, is carried by railroads; the bulk of railroad trans-
portation is in interstate commerce governed by the Federal Bills of
Lading Act, and under straight, non-negotiable bills.29 Water-borne
tonnage amounts to some three-quarters of a billion; inter-city motor
carriers account for between one and two hundred million tons; air
carriers carry a much smaller tonnage. It seems likely that the most
important impact of the Code on transportation will relate to rail and
water imports from abroad and to intrastate shipments by rail and truck.
Public warehouses handle a smaller tonnage of merchandise than
carriers; and the goods are likely to remain in their hands for a longer
time."0 The greatest need for warehousing arises where production is
seasonal and consumption is not, as in the case of agricultural com-
modities. Of some 3400 public warehouses shown by the 1940 Census
of Business, about half handled general merchandise and household
goods; the remainder consisted primarily of cold-storage and farm-
product warehouses, In 1952 there were 1434 warehouses holding
federal licenses under the United States Warehouse Act for the storage
of agricultural products; over half were grain warehouses and almost
one-third were cotton warehouses. Cotton warehouses operating under
federal licenses handle perhaps one-and-one-half billion dollars worth
of cotton in a year.
27. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Griffin v.
McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
28. See UCC § 1-105, comment 1.
29. See Statement of Mr. Albert Ward, Hearing before Enlarged Editorial
Board, 6 BusINss LAWYER 168, 170, 172 (1951). For transportation statistics, see
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952.
30. For warehouse statistics, see 3 U.S. CENSUS OF BUSINESS 16 (1940); RE-
PORT OF THE PRODUCTION AND MARKETING ADMIINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICuL-
TURE, FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1952, p. 116 (1953).
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Enough has been said to indicate that the storage and shipment of
merchandise are important in volume and dollar amount. Title docu-
ments not only play an important part in the mechanics of storage and
shipment; they are also used as a basis of credit to finance those proc-
esses. Large sums of money are lent on the faith of such documents,
both by such Government agencies as the Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion " and by banks and other private lenders.32 Two patterns are
followed in the usual financing transaction: a negotiable document is
issued, calling for delivery to bearer or to the order of the depositor,
and negotiated to the bank; or a nonnegotiable document is issued, call-
ing for delivery to the bank.
I. FORMS OF DOCUMENTS
Warehouse Receipts: Under the Code, as under the UWRA,
warehouse receipts may be issued by any "warehouseman."' The
definition of warehouseman has been slightly changed to make it clear
that state and cooperative warehouses are covered and that violations
of law by a warehouseman do not remove his receipts from the scope
of the Code. The issuer is bound by the obligations imposed by Article
7 even though the receipt covers his own goods, or even though he is
not a warehouseman; " but, unless he is engaged in the business of
storing goods "for others," his document does not come within the
definition of "warehouse receipt." Thus the Code may not apply to a
receipt issued by one who stores only his own goods&' A court might,
however, protect a holder of such a receipt on estoppel grounds.38
Many warehouse receipts are issued subject to Standard Contract
Terms and Conditions for General Merchandising and Cold Storage
Warehouses, adopted at a conference of industry representatives and
approved October 30, 1926 by the United States Department of Com-
merce.3 7  Such terms, usually printed on the back of the receipt and
incorporated by reference on its face, are optional under both the
31. See Scroggifn Farms Corp. v. McFadden, 165 F.2d 10 (8th Cir. 1948);
Hearings before Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations ot Dep't of
Agriculture Appropriations for 1953, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1410, 1430-50 (1952);
Hearings before Committee on Agriculture and Forestry on Sen. Res. 256, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 58 (1952).
32. See RICHARDS, TnE MARKETING OF COTTON AND THE FINANCINo OF COTTON
MERCHANTS (Chase Nat. Bank 1949).
33. UCC §§ 1-201(44), 7-102(1)(h), 7-201; UWRA §§1, 58(1).
34. UCC § 7-401(c), (d).
35. Cf. Moore v. Thomas Moore Distilling Co., 247 Pa. 312, 93 Atl. 347 (1915).
36. UCC § 1-103; cf. State Street Trust Co. v. Lawrence Mfg. Co., 284 Mass.
355, 187 N.E. 755 (1933). The same result might be reached by construing UCC
§ 7-401(d) as if it contained the following bracketed words: "if it is [in form]
a warehouse receipt."
37. See BRAUCHER, SUTHERLAND & WILLCOX, CommERcIAL TRANsACTIONS:
TExT-FoRs-STATuTEs, Forms 27, 29, pp. 172-81 (1953).
DOCUMENTS OF TITLE IN UCC
UWRA 3 1 and the Code,"9 unless they conflict with specific provisions.
Both statutes require as essential terms (a) warehouse location (b)
date of issue (c) consecutive number (d) designation of obligee (e)
rate of charges " (f) description of goods or packages (g) signature
of the warehouseman or his agent (h) disclosure when warehouseman
is owner or part owner of goods (i) statement of advances and liabili-
ties for which a lien is claimed.4"
Under the UWRA a failure to include essential terms may mean
that the document is not a warehouse receipt at all, and hence is not
subject to the Act.Y The UCC guards against this result expressly
as to obligations of the issuer, and the provision for essential terms
states only that the warehouseman is liable for any loss caused by
omission.44 It would seem, therefore, that the question whether a
document is a warehouse receipt for any purpose should depend solely
on whether it comes within the definitions of "document of title" and
"warehouse receipt." 45
Bills of Lading: The Code,4 like the UBLA,4T applies to bills of
lading issued by common carriers. The Code expressly covers airbills,
air consignment notes and air waybills, and is broadened to include
bills issued by contract carriers and freight forwarders as well. The
provisions of the UBLA for essential terms,4" very similar to those of
the UWRA, are omitted from the Code. The Interstate Commerce
Commission has prescribed forms of railroad bills 49 which seem to be
38. UWRA §§ 2, 3.
39. UCC §§ 7-202, 1-102(3).
40. UWRA § 2(e) says "rate of storage charges"; UCC § 7-202 (2) (e) says
"rate of storage and handling charges." Omission of this term does not make the re-
ceipt invalid. Manufacturers' Mercantile Co. v. Monarch Refrigerating Co., 266
Ill. 584, 107 N.E. 885 (1915); cf. First Nat. Bank of Fort Worth v. Donald, 84
S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
41. UWRA § 2(i); UCC § 7-202(2) (i) says "lien or security interest." See
text at notes 163-204 infra.
42. Rapp v. Germantown Fireproof Storage Co., 44 Pa. D. & C. 164 (C.P.
Philadelphia County 1942); see Rodgers v. Murray, 247 S.W. 888, 889 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1923). But cf. Smith Bros. Co. v. Richheimer & Co., 145 La. 1066, 83 So. 255
(1919) ; note 40 supra.
43. UCC § 7-401 (a).
44. UCC § 7-202(2). This provision is not limited, as is the corresponding
provision of UWRA § 2, to negotiable receipts.
45. UCC § 1-201(15), (44); see text at notes 8-32 supra. Cf. State Bank of
Wilbur v. Almira Farmers Warehouse Co., 123 Wash. 354, 212 Pac. 543 (1923)
(weight tickets not warehouse receipts).
46. UCC § 1-201(6).
47. UBLA § 1.
48. UBLA §§ 2, 3.
49. In the Matter of Bills of Lading, 14 I.C.C. 346 (1908), 52 I.C.C. 671 (1919);
Domestic Bill of Lading and Live Stock Contract-In the Matter of Bills of Lading,
64 I.C.C. 357 (1921), 66 I.C.C. 63 (1922), 167 I.C.C. 214 (1930); In the Matter
of Bills of Lading, Domestic Bill of Lading, and Live Stock Contract, 172 I.C.C.
362 (1931), 245 I.C.C. 527 (1941). See BRaucHER, SUTHERLAND & WILcox,
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: T=xT-Foa ms-STATuTEs, Forms 30, 31, pp. 184-91
(1953); 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1073, 1110A (Rev. ed. 1936).
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used without discrimination between interstate and intrastate com-
merce, and it was apparently thought that the regulation of the forms
should be left to the regulatory agencies.s°
Freight forwarders have long engaged in the business of con-
solidating less-than-carload shipments into carloads to obtain the benefit
of carload rail rates.5 After World War I they entered the field of
motor carrier transportation and the coordination of truck and rail
transportation, and became embroiled in rate controversies52 which
finally resulted in 1942 in the addition of Part IV to the Interstate
Commerce Act to regulate their interstate activities.5" By the 1942
statute freight forwarders were required to issue bills of lading to their
shippers,M and the Interstate Commerce Commission has made rules
governing the issue of freight-forwarder bills of lading.55 In 1949
the Supreme Court said that "Congress studiously avoided charac-
terizing forwarders as carriers," "' but in 1950 the statute was amended
to define a freight forwarder as a "common carrier." 57 The result
would seem to be to confirm the application of the Federal Bills of
Lading Act to interstate bills of lading issued by freight forwarders.5
Thus the Code provisions for freight-forwarder bills of lading, as
state law, will apparently apply only to intrastate shipments and foreign
imports. Under the federal law the freight forwarder seems still to
be classified as a shipper in relation to a railroad or trucker; and cus-
tomers of a freight forwarder have been permitted to recover as undis-
closed principals to the bill of lading issued by the railroad or trucker
to the forwarder.59 The Code provides for the discharge of the carrier
by delivery in accordance with the bill of lading issued by it, but other-
wise subjects title based on that bill of lading to the rights of holders
50. See Statement of Mr. Albert Ward, supra note 29, at 169.
51. ICC v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 220 U.S. 235 (1911); see Freight For-
warders, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee ol Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on H.R. 5967, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 21-8, 71-91 (1950).
52. Ibid.; Freight Forwarding Investigation, 229 I.C.C. 201 (1938); Acme Fast
Freight, Inc. v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 968 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 309
U.S. 638 (1940); United States v. Chicago Heights Trucking Co., 310 U.S. 344
(1940).
53. 56 STAr. 284 (1942), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1001-22 (Supp. 1952).
54. 56 STAT. 295 (1942), 49 U.S.C. § 1013 (1946).
55. Bills of Lading of Freight Forwarders, 259 I.C.C. 277 (1944).
56. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R. v. Acme Fast Freight, Inc., 336 U.S. 465, 477
(1949).
57. 64 STAT. 1113 (1950), 49 U.S.C. §1002(a)(5) (Supp. 1952). See, accord,
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 2 C.A.B. 531, 538 (1941); American Airlines, Inc.
v. C.A.B., 178 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1949).
58. 39 STAT. 538 (1916), 49 U.S.C. §81 (1946). Accord, Slutzlin v. Gerhard
& Hey, Inc., 199 App. Div. 5, 191 N.Y. Supp. 104 (1st Dep't 1921).
59. Thompson v. Am. Abrasive Metals Co., 253 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. Civ. App.
1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); see Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R. v. Acme
Fast Freight, Inc., 336 U.S. 465, 487 n.27 (1949).
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of bills issued by the forwarder.' Railroad representatives have sug-
gested that the Code thereby imposes on the railroad direct liability to
the forwarder's principal in the event of loss or damage."' But their
objection to "the possibility of a multitude of suits" seems to be an
objection to existing law as well.
"Through bills of lading," not mentioned in the Federal Bills of
Lading Act or the UBLA, are covered by the Code.62 The Carmack
Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act requires common carriers
receiving property for interstate shipment or for export to an adjacent
foreign country to "issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor"; the
initial carrier is made responsible to the lawful holder for any damage
to the property caused by it or by a connecting carrier "when trans-
ported on a through bill of lading." ' The delivering carrier is also
made responsible, and the initial or delivering carrier is given a right
over against the carrier on whose line the damage is sustained. The
Code provisions are patterned generally on the federal provisions, but
impose no obligation to issue through bills." Under the Code, also,
the delivering carrier seems not to be liable for defaults of prior
carriers.
The Code provision for through bills will apply primarily to intra-
state shipments, but may also apply to some aspects of import ship-
ments." It makes one important departure from the federal law by
extending the initial carrier's liability to acts of other "persons acting
as its agents" "I as well as connecting carriers; such other persons
might, for example, include warehousemen. The Code provision might
also, contrary to federal law,67 subject a railroad to liability to a freight
forwarder independent of the railroad bill of lading.
60. UCC § 7-503 (2).
61. See Statement of Mr. Albert Ward, supra note 29, at 171.
62. UCC § 7-302.
63. 34 STAT. 593 (1906), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §20(11), (12) (1946), as
amended, 49 U.S.C. § 20(11), (12) (Supp. 1952) ; made applicable to motor carriers
by 49 STAT. 563 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 319 (1946); made applicable to
freight forwarders by 56 STAT. 295 (1942), 49 U.S.C. § 1013 (1946).
64. See UCC § 7-302, comment 1. In Mexican Light & Power Co. v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 33 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1940), the railroad avoided liability for damage
on the Mexican Railway by issuing a bill of lading to Laredo, Texas, "for export
to El Oro." But cf. Mexican Light & Power Co. v. Texas Mexican Ry., 331 U.S.
731 (1947).
65. Cf. Alwine v. Pennsylvania R.R., 141 Pa. Super. 558, 15 A.2d 507 (1940);
Reider v. Thompson, 339 U.S. 113, 118 (1950).
66. UCC §7-302(1).
67. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R. v. Acme Fast Freight, Inc., 336 U.S. 465
(1949). The 1950 amendment, supra note 57, was not intended to change this federal
rule. Chapter 1140, § 3, 64 STAT. 1114 (1950), 49 U.S.C. p. 2435 (Supp. 1952) ; see
H.R. REI. No. 2489, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
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The Code also makes provision for bills of lading in a set." The
UBLA prohibits the use of negotiable bills in a set for transportation
to any place on the continent of North America, except Alaska; 69 the
Code prohibits their use "except where customary in overseas trans-
portation." 7' Except perhaps for some aspects of foreign imports, such
bills will normally be governed by the Federal Bills of Lading Act,
which excepts Panama and other possessions of the United States, and
foreign countries."
The "destination bill" is a legal invention included in the Code to
resolve the problem arising from the fact that high-speed air or truck
transportation may deliver the goods at destination before the bill of
lading can arrive by mail.72 The Code authorizes the carrier to procure
the issuance of the bill at destination or elsewhere, either originally
at the request of the consignor or subsequently, on surrender of the
original bill, at the request of the person entitled to control the goods.
The carrier may then use wire or cable to give directions for the issue
of the destination or substitute bill.
Negotiability: There are important differences between negotiable
and nonnegotiable documents of title, particularly with respect to their
use as security. The negotiable document more effectively represents
the goods, for the bailee is under a duty not to deliver the goods without
surrender of the document.73 Nonnegotiable documents often provide
that the goods will be delivered on detached written authority without
return of the document.
It is therefore important to distinguish negotiable documents from
nonnegotiable documents. Under ICC rules, order bills of lading,
negotiable, are printed on yellow paper; straight or nonnegotiable bills
are printed on white paper. The uniform acts require also that non-
negotiable bills of lading and warehouse receipts be "plainly" so marked
on their face.74 The Code omits that requirement, though a trace of
it remains in the use of "Non-Negotiable Bill of Lading" as an example
in the definition of "conspicuous." 75
The Code, like the uniform acts, tests negotiability by the terms
in which the document designates the person to whom the goods are to
68. UCC § 7-304.
69. UBLA § 6.
70. UCC §7-304(1) ; see UCC § 2-323(3).
71. 39 STAT. 539 (1916), 49 U.S.C. §84 (1946).
72. UCC § 7-305; see Sneed, A Proposed Solution to the Documentary Problem
of Airborne International Trade, 65 HAgv. L. REv. 1392 (1952) ; Note, 44 ILL. L.
REV. 100 (1942).
73. UWRA §§11, 12, 54; UBLA §§14, 15; UCC §7-403(2).
74. UWRA § 7; UBLA § 8, 50.
75. UCC § 1-201(10).
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be delivered .7  The Code provides that warehouse receipts, bills of
lading, and other documents of title are negotiable if the goods are to
be delivered to bearer or to the order of a named person, or, where
recognized in overseas trade, to a named person or assigns.77 The
provisions for bills of lading running to bearer and for documents of
title other than warehouse receipts and bills of lading are found in
the Uniform Sales Act but not the UWRA or UBLA; the provision
for documents running to a named person or assigns is new. Such
provisions may or may not control cases where the distinction between
negotiable and nonnegotiable form is confused, as by printing on paper
of the wrong color.78
Duplicates: The Code continues and makes more precise the re-
quirement that duplicate negotiable documents be plainly marked as
duplicates, and extends it to nonnegotiable documents.79  It also pro-
vides expressly that an unmarked duplicate confers no rights in the
goods except in cases of bills in a set, overissue of documents for
fungible goods, and substitutes for lost documents."0 The requirement
does not apply to documents covering the same goods but not issued
by the same issuer, such as a warehouse receipt and a delivery order
issued by the holder of the receipt, or a freight forwarder's bill of lading
and a railroad bill issued to the forwarder.
8"
Alteration: The Code provides that alteration of either a ware-
house receipt or a bill of lading leaves it enforceable according to its
original tenor. The same rule applies to the filling of blanks in a bill
of lading, but a bona fide purchaser may treat as authorized the filling
of a blank in a negotiable warehouse receipt.8" Under the UWRA,
filling of blanks would seem to have the same effect as alteration; s1
the UBLA provision applies to any addition or erasure after issue un-
less authority from the carrier was in writing or noted on the bill.
4
76. UCC §7-104; see USA §27; UWRA §§4, 5; UBLA §§4, 5.
77. As to "or assigns," see, contra: Gubelman v. Panama R.R., 192 App. Div.
165, 182 N.Y. Supp. 403 (1st Dep't 1920); Goldstein v. Societa Veneziana per
L'Industria delle Conterie, 193 App. Div. 168, 183 N.Y. Supp. 460 (1st Dep't 1920).
78. Cf. Rountree v. Lydick-Barmann Co., 150 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App.
1941).
79. UCC §§ 7402, 1-201(10) ; compare UWRA §§ 6, 15, 52; UBLA §§ 7, 18,
46. As to nonnegotiable documents, see Brock v. Atteberry, 153 La. 650, 96 So.
505 (1923).
80. Cf. Small v. Slater, 144 Wash. 268, 257 Pac. 625 (1927). But cf. Missouri
Pac. Ry. v. Heidenheimer, 82 Tex. 195, 199-201, 17 S.W. 608, 610-611 (1891).
81. See notes 217-23 infra.
82. UCC §§ 7-208, 7-306. Cf. Chicago, R.I. & G. Ry. v. Floyd, 161 S.W. 954
(Tex. Civ. App. 1913) (consignor not bound by term inserted in bill).
83. UWRA § 13.
84. UBLA § 16.
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The UWRA preserved the bailee's obligation to deliver, but imposed
a theoretical forfeiture of "any other liability" of the warehouseman
to an alterer or a person who took with notice.
III. LIABILITIES OF THE BAILEE
Nonreceipt and Misdescription: At common law it was held by
many courts that a warehouseman or carrier was not bound by a docu-
ment of title issued by an agent who had received no goods." The
UWRA was held not to have changed this rule in Massachusetts,"0 but
the UBLA provided expressly for liability on bills issued by an agent
"the scope of whose actual or apparent authority includes the issuing
of bills of lading." 87 In 1922 the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws recommended an amendment to make the UWRA conform, and
some 17 states have adopted it."8 The Code carries a similar provision
in its definition of "issuer." " Apparently the Code has not changed
Pennsylvania law on the point, since the issuer seems to have been
liable there without statutory provision.90
The Code provision for bills of lading, like that of the UBLA,
imposes liability for nonreceipt to the "holder" of a duly negotiated bill
or the "consignee" of a nonnegotiable bill."' It thus avoids a defect
found in the FBLA, which, as to goods. subject to a straight bill, pro-
tects only the "owner" and is therefore illusory when no goods are
shipped. 2  Under the Code, as under the previous statutes, the statu-
tory protection is limited to persons who rely on the bill of lading.9"
As to warehouse receipts and other documents of title, the Code
may give broader protection; it runs to any "party to or purchaser for
value in good faith of" the document." That language may cover an
innocent depositor as a "party" without proof of reliance. It may also
85. See WILLISTON, SALES § 419 (Rev. ed. 1948) and cases cited therein.
86. Rosenberg v. National Dock & Storage Warehouse Co., 218 Mass. 518, 106
N.E. 171 (1914).
87. UBLA § 23; compare FBLA § 22, 49 U.S.C. §102 (1946) which seems to
require that the same agent also have authority to receive goods.
88. UWRA §20, 3 U.L.A. §20 (Supp. 1953). Compare Mass. Acts 1948, c.
145, p. 99, amending MASS. GEN. LAws, c. 105, §26 (1932).
89. UCC _i 7-102(1) (f) as incorporated in §§7-203, 7-301.
90. Cf. Brooke v. New York, L. E. & W. R.R., 108 Pa. 529, 1 Atl. 206 (1885);
Dulaney v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 228 Pa. 180, 77 Atl. 507 (1910).
91. UCC §7-301(1); UBLA §23.
92. Martin Jesse Motors, Inc. v. Reading Co., 87 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1949),
aff'd, 181 F.2d 766 (3d Cir. 1950), 63 HARv. L. REv. 1439. But cf. Gleason v. Sea-
board Air Line Ry., 278 U.S. 349 (1929) (carrier liable though statute not ap-
plicable).
93. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Boston & M.R.R., 298 Mass. 152, 10 N.E.2d
59 (1937); Strohmeyer & Arpe Co. v. American Line SS. Corp., 97 F.2d 360 (2d
Cir. 1938).
94. UCC § 7-203.
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protect a bank which purchases a nonnegotiable document from a party
who fraudulently procured it without depositing goods. 5
Liability for misdescription is dealt with on the same footing as
liability for nonreceipt.9" An early decision under the FBIJA held that
misdating was not within the statutory provision covering "the descrip-
tion therein of the goods," 17 and the Act was amended to cover mis-
dating expressly.9" The Code contains no such express provision, and
is open to the same interpretation as the FBLA before the amendment.
Aside from statute, a recital in a document may be evidence, though
rebuttable, against the issuer; " and the issuer is estopped to deny the
recital when it has been relied on by a purchaser."°
The Code, like predecessor statutes, does not impose liability for
failure to describe the goods, or make a failure to note exceptions equiv-
alent to an affirmative recital of good condition.1"' The standard forms
of bills of lading recite receipt "in apparent good order, except as noted
(contents and condition of contents of packages unknown)"; warehouse
receipts have similar provisions and commonly carry the words "said to
be or contain" before the description of the goods. Such statements,
if true, protect the bailee both under the Code and under predecessor
statutes, but the Code newly requires that such statements be con-
spicuous, except in bills of lading, and defines "conspicuous." 102
"Shipper's load and count," or words of like purport, may be
inserted in bills of lading to indicate that the goods were loaded by the
shipper.10 If true, such statements, like "said to contain," free the
carrier from responsibility for misdescription resulting from improper
loading by the shipper. It has been held that "weight subject to cor-
rection" is not of like purport to "shipper's load and count," and does
95. For denial of such protection to a purchaser of a straight bill of lading, see
Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. v. State Nat. Bank, 280 Ky. 444, 133 S.W.2d 511 (1939),
283 Ky. 443, 141 S.W.2d 869 (1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 689 (1940)
96. UCC §§ 7-203, 7-301.
97. Browne v. Union Pac. R.R., 113 Kan. 726, 216 Pac. 299 (1923), aff'd on
other grounds, 267 U.S. 255 (1925).
98. FBLA §22, amended by 44 STAT. 1450 (1927), 49 US.C. § 102 (1946).
99. Beresin v. Pennsylvania R.R., 116 Pa. Super. 291, 176 Atl. 774 (1935). Cf.
Banner Mfg. Co. v. Long Island R.R., 277 App. Div. 142, 97 N.Y.S.2d 730 (1st
Dep't 1950).
100. Olivier Straw Goods Corp. v. Osaka Shosen Kaisha, 27 F.2d 129 (2d Cir.
1928); The Carso, 53 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 679 (1931).
101. Austin Nichols & Co. v. Steamship "Isla de Panay"; 267 U.S. 260 (1925);
Josephy v. Panhandle & S.F. Ry., 235 N.Y. 306, 139 N.E. 277 (1923).
102. UCC §§1-201(10), 7-203. Section 7-301 comment 1, referring to "con-
spicuous disclosure" in bills of lading, is a holdover from a previous draft, no longer
justified by the text. See UCC § 7-301 (Proposed Final Draft, text and comments
ed., Spring 1950).
103. UBLA § 23; FBLA §§ 20, 21, 49 U.S.C. §§ 100, 101 (1946) ; UCC § 7-301.
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not relieve the carrier of liability."0 4 And the carrier remains liable
when the statement is false, as where the bill is issued before loading."5
The Code seems merely to restate preexisting law on such points, but
adds an express right of the carrier to indemnity from the shipper for
any misdescription furnished by the shipper.
Damage to Goods: The Code restates the law on the liability of
warehousemen and carriers for loss or injury to goods.' In both
cases, the liability is stated in terms of a duty to exercise such care as a
"reasonably careful man would exercise under like circumstances."
But those provisions do not change "any existing law or rule of law
which imposes a higher responsibility." The result is to retain the
existing rule which obtains in many states that a common carrier is an
insurer of the safety of the goods except as to acts of God or the public
enemy, fault of the owner, inherent defect, or causes excepted by
express contract. 7 In many situations, however, the liability of a
warehouseman for negligence seems in practice to produce results at
least equally strict.'
The Code provisions are subject to the general rule of the Code
that obligations of reasonable care may not be disclaimed by agreement,
but that the parties may by agreement determine the standards by
which performance of such obligations is measured, if such standards
are not manifestly unreasonable. 0 9 Course of dealing and usage of
trade may have the effect of agreement." 0 In addition the sections on
duty of care expressly preserve any existing law or rule of law which
invalidates contractual limitations. Subject to those restrictions, and
to regulatory statutes and tariffs, classifications, and regulations there-
under, the Code expressly permits certain types of limitation of
liability."'
104. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Bewsher, 6 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1925), cert. denied,
270 U.S. 641 (1926). But cf. Leigh Ellis & Co. v. Payne, 274 Fed. 443 (N.D. Ga.),
aff'd, sub nom. Leigh Ellis & Co., 276 Fed. 400 (5th Cir. 1921), 260 U.S. 682
(1923).105. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Stephens Nat. Bank, 75 F.2d 398 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 295 U.S. 738 (1935) ; cf. Alton Iron Co. v. Wabash Ry., 235 I1. App.
151 (1924), ree'd on other grounds, 328 Ill. 353, 159 N.E. 802 (1927).
106. UCC §§ 7-204, 7-309. Compare UWRA §§ 3, 21; UBLA § 3.
107. See Villari v. James, 155 Pa. Super. 155, 158, 38 A.2d 379, 380 (1944);
4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1089 (Rev. ed. 1936).
108. Compare Roberts v. General Cold Storage Co., 120 Pa. Super. 508, 183
Atl. 71 (1936) (warehouseman liable for sprouting of plants in cold storage), with
Jackson & Perkins Co. v. Mushroom Transp. Co., 351 Pa. 583, 41 A.2d 635 (1945),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 733 (1945) (carrier not liable for freezing of plants in unheated
truck); compare UWRA § 8; 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1048 n.5 (Rev. ed. 1936).
109. UCC § 1-102(3) (c); compare UWRA 3; UBLA § 3; 4 WILLISTON, CoN-
TRACTS §§ 1046, 1089A, 1109 (Rev. ed. 1936); see Villari v. James, 155 Pa. Super.
155, 159, 38 A.2d 379, 381 (1944).
110. UCC § 1-205.
111. UCC § 7-103; cf. Kirwan v. Railway Express Agency, 118 Pa. Super. 431,
179 Atl. 924 (1935).
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Limitation of the amount of liability by reference to a declared
value of the goods deposited has been the subject of controversy." 2
The Carmack Amendment established the validity of such "released
value" provisions in interstate rail transportation, and the Code adopts
a "generalized version" of the Carmack Amendment, applicable to
private as well as common carriers." Although the language is not
identical with that of the Carmack Amendment, the Code provision
may well be construed similarly, so as to permit, for example, a dis-
claimer of liability for undeclared articles of extraordinary value, hidden
from view." 4  The Code expressly makes such limitations ineffective
where the goods are converted by the carrier to its own use."' The
Code provisions for limitation of liability to declared value are differ-
ently worded for warehousemen than for carriers, though generally
similar; the main added restriction on warehousemen's agreements
seems to be the requirement that the agreement set out a "specific lia-
bility per article or item, or value per unit of weight." "'
As to limitations in terms of time and manner of presenting claims
and instituting actions, the Code permits "reasonable provisions" in
warehouse receipts, bills of lading, or tariffs."17 The test of reasonable-
ness has been applied in numerous cases both before and under the
uniform acts.""' Under the Carmack Amendment, the shortest con-
tractual limitations permitted as to interstate shipments are nine months
for filing claims and two years for instituting suit, the latter period to
be computed from the day when the carrier disallows the claim in
writing; and the uniform bill-of-lading forms require claim in writing
within nine months after delivery or after a reasonable time for delivery,
and suit within two years and one day from written notice of disallow-
ance. Those clauses, as to interstate shipments, cannot be waived by
the carrier,"" and have been held to override state statutes of limita-
tions. 2 Where the Carmack Amendment is not applicable, the deci-
112. See 4 WLisToN, CONTRACTS §§ 1046, 1110 (Rev. ed. 1936).
113. UCC §7-309 comment; Interstate Commerce Act §20(11) 34 STAT. 593
(1906), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1946); see 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§1110A (Rev. ed. 1936).
114. Cf. Kirwan v. Railway Express Agency, 118 Pa. Super. 431, 179 Atl. 924
(1935).
115. UCC § 7-309(1). Cf. Van Dyke v. Pennsylvania R.R., 86 A.2d 346 (Del.
Super. 1952).
116. UCC § 7-204(1) (a).
117. UCC §§ 7-204(1)(b), 7-309(1)(b).
118. See 4 WILLIsToN, CONTRACTS § 1112 (Rev. ed. 1936) and cases cited therein.
119. Insurance Co. of North America v. Newtowne Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 675 (1st
Cir. 1951).
120. Neuss, Hesslein & Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 221 La. 296,
59 So.2d 195 (1952), 66 HAgv. L. Rv. 923 (1953). But cf. Louisiana & W.R.R. v.
Gardiner, 273 U.S. 280 (1927) (state statute of limitations applied when contract
provision invalid).
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sions have found shorter periods of time to be reasonable, but have
upheld waivers by carriers.12' Such provisions seem to have been far
less common in warehouse receipts than in bills of lading, but it seems
that the rules would be the -same both at common law and under the
Code. 2
Aftsdelivery: A primary purpose of the Code provisions on delivery
is to simplify the statement of the bailee's obligation on the document.'
Under Section 7-403 (1) the bailee has the duty to deliver to a "person
entitled under the document," unless he can establish one of six listed
defenses which purport to be exhaustive. 4
Subsection 1 (a) permits the bailee to deliver to a person whose
receipt is rightful as against the claimant. The principal case covered
is that of a title paramount to the rights under the document, such as
the title of an owner whose goods were stolen and deposited with the
bailee by the thief." In such a case the bailee is safe in making delivery
pursuant to the document only if he acts in good faith; the true owner
is the person entitled to delivery,'26 and the bailee who makes the proper
delivery has a defense against persons claiming under the document.
The catch-all language of Subsection (1) (f) may well protect a
bailee who delivers pursuant to oral instructions of the person en-
titled,12 7 despite the requirement of "written instructions" in the defini-
tion of "person entitled under the document." The succeeding sub-
121. See note 118 supra. Contra: Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. v. Kileen,
243 Wis. 161, 9 N.W2d 616 (1943).
122. Cf. Home Ins. Co. of New York v. Los Angeles Warehouse Co., 16
Cal. App. 2d 737, 61 P.2d 510 (1936) (requirement of claim within thirty days after
delivery from warehouse, enforced).
123. See UCC § 7-403, comment 1; compare UCC §§ 7-403, 7-404, with UWRA
§§ 8-12, 16, 19, and UBLA §§ 11-15, 19, 22.
124. UCC §7-403(1) :
"The bailee must deliver the goods to a person entitled under the document
who complies with subsection (2), unless and to the extent that the bailee
establishes any of the following:
(a) delivery of the goods to a person whose receipt was rightful as against
the claimant;
(b) damage to or loss or destruction of the goods for which the bailee
is not liable;
(c) previous sale or other disposition of the goods in lawful enforcement
of a lien or on warehouseman's lawful termination of storage;
(d) the exercise by a seller of his right to stop delivery pursuant to the
provisions of the Article on Sales (Section 2-705) ;
(e) a diversion, reconsignment or other disposition pursuant to the pro-
visions of this Article (Section 7-303) or tariff regulating such right;
(f) release, satisfaction or any other fact affording a personal defense
against the claimant."
125. UCC § 7-403 comment 2.
126. UCC §7-503(1).
127. Cf. Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Texas Compress Co., 294 S.W. 331 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1927).
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sections state the conditions a claimant must perform, require cancel-
lation of or notation on a negotiable document, and define "a person
entitled under the document." The succeeding section grants the
bailee immunity from liability for innocent conversion if he delivers
in good faith pursuant to the document. 8
The conditions which the claimant must meet include satisfaction
of the bailee's lien and surrender of any negotiable document for can-
cellation or for notation of partial deliveries. The owner of a para-
mount title, of course, need not surrender the document; but the Code
seems to require him to satisfy the bailee's lien in some circumstances. 9
The Code requires the bailee to take the initiative by requesting satis-
faction of the lien; prior law had been construed to require an offer by
the claimant without any request. 30 Under a more general provision
of the Code, the bailee would also be entitled to a signed receipt as a
condition of completing a tendered delivery. 1' Failure of the claimant
to perform any of these conditions would seem to excuse refusal to
deliver.
Delivery to the wrong person, under the Code as under prior
law,' 32 would seem to subject the bailee to an absolute liability to the
person entitled under the document, even though, for example, the
bailee relied on a skillfully forged delivery order. When a negotiable
warehouse receipt is outstanding, the bailee has been held liable to the
holder even for surrender of the goods under the compulsion of legal
process.' 3  The Code states the duty to take up a negotiable document
or to note partial deliveries thereon in terms which suggest that that
result may be continued for warehouse receipts and extended to bills
of lading.3 4
The bailee is protected in making delivery in good faith to the
holder of a negotiable document, even though the holder is a wrong-
128. UCC § 7-404. Accord, RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§230, 235 (1934). "Good
faith" here includes "observance of reasonable commercial standards." Contrast
UCC § 1-201(19); see Due Negotiation, text at notes 253-78 infra.
129. UCC §7-209(3), 7-307(2). See Charges Covered, text at notes 163-77
infra.
130. UCC §7-403(2) and comment 4. National Warehouse Co. v. United
States, 27 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1928).
131. UCC § 1-206.
132. UCC § 7-403(3). Freedman v. Geo. W. Bush & Sons Co., 284 Pa. 16, 130
Atl. 263 (1925); Adel Precision Products Corp. v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 332 Mich.
519, 51 N.W.2d 922, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 831 (1952).
133. Manufacturers' Mercantile Co. v. Monarch Refrigerating Co., 266 Ill. 584,
107 N.E. 885 (1915); UWRA §§ 10, 11, 25. But not as to bills of lading: UBLA
§§ 14, 15.
134. See UCC § 7-403(2),(3), and comment 5. It has been proposed in Massa-
chusetts, apparently with the informal approval of the enlarged Editorial Board
of the sponsoring organzations, to revise those paragraphs and delete the comment.
See REP. MASS. SPECIAL Coamm'x TO INvESTIGATE AND STUDY THE UCC 27, 148
(January 1954). The effect of the revision is not clear. See note 194 infra.
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doer." But if the bailee fails to take up the document, he becomes
liable to any person to whom the document is duly negotiated. 8 In
cases of partial delivery, notation on the document is a substitute for
taking it up; the Code newly'requires that the notation be conspicuous.
That liability has been held not to run to a true owner who, with full
knowledge of the delivery, took back the document from the wrong-
doing holder.137  The bailee who delivers by mistake should be entitled
to recover the goods or their value from a recipient who is not entitled
to them. 3  But the bailee's rights may well not run against a bona fide
purchaser of the goods from the recipient, and it has been held that a
carrier cannot better its position against such a bona fide purchaser by
taking up the bill of lading.'89 These points are not expressly dealt
with in the Code; 4o nor is the holding, made on facts arising prior
to the UBLA, that a carrier's liability did not run to a bona fide pur-
chaser of a negotiable bill of lading who took it several months after
the delivery, its "spent" quality having been concealed by alteration of
the date."'
There is no statutory duty to take up a nonnegotiable document,
although the terms of the document may impose a contractual duty.'4
In the absence of such terms or of a lawful excuse, delivery on written
instructions from the named person is required." The Code provides
that indorsement of nonnegotiable documents does not add to the trans-
feree's rights,' but it would seem that an indorsement might constitute
adequate "written instructions." The Code takes no express position
on the effect of consignment to X "in care of Y," which has been held
to authorize delivery to Y, or to X "notify Y," which has been held not
135. UCC §§ 7-403(4), 7-404; UWRA § 9(c); UBLA § 12(c) ; Pere Marquette
Ry. v. J. F. French & Co., 254 U.S. 538 (1921).
136. ". . . unless the person to whom the goods were delivered is one against
whom the document confers no right under Section 7-503(1)." UCC §7-403(3).
See also UWRA §§ 11, 12; UBLA §§ 14, 15; Morse-Hubbard Co. v. Michigan C.
R.R., 286 Ill. App. 163, 3 N.E.2d 93 (1936).
137. Pere Marquette Ry. v. J. F. French & Co., 254 U.S. 538 (1921).
138. Pa. Laws 1881, No. 95, p. 86, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 3 (Purdon 1930),
not repealed by UCC § 10-102; Hubbard Bros. & Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 256 Fed.
761 (5th Cir. 1919).
139. Southern Pac. Co. v. Bank of America, 29 F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1928),
cert. denied, 279 U.S. 847 (1929) ; Chicago G.W.R.R. v. Lowry, 119 Kan. 336, 239
Pac. 758 (1925).
140. Compare UCC § 2-403 (bona fide purchase of voidable title; entrusting of
possession to a merchant).
141. Saugerties Bank v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 236 N.Y. 425, 141 N.E. 904
(1923). Compare UBLA §§ 14, 16; UCC §§ 7-306, 7-501(4), 7-502 comment 3.
142. Cf. Cundill v. Lewis, 245 N.Y. 383, 157 N.E. 502 (1927).
143. UCC §7-403(1),(4).
144. UCC § 7-501(5).
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to authorize delivery to Y.'45 Nor does it provide for fictitious con-
signees or impostors.
146
Diversion and Reconsignment: The uniform acts placed the bailee's
right or duty to obey changed instructions upon the same footing as
the right or duty to deliver. The Code seems to continue that policy
except under straight bills of lading. Thus a warehouseman may obey
instructions from the holder of a negotiable warehouse receipt or from
the person to whom delivery is to be made by the terms of a non-
negotiable receipt, if under the circumstances delivery would be
proper.1 47  Apparently, however, written instructions may be revoked
to the extent that they have not been acted on, and the warehouseman
will be protected in good faith obedience to superseding instructions. 48
When goods are in transit under a bill of lading, it is often im-
portant that the carrier be clearly authorized to obey the instructions
of some person, so that the goods may be diverted to a new destination.
The UBLA, in the absence of contrary notification, authorizes delivery
to the person entitled under the document; but if conflicting instructions
are received the carrier is protected only if it delivers to "a person law-
fully entitled to the possession of the goods." "' This means that the
carrier must either delay action until the conflicting claims are resolved
or determine at its peril who is "lawfully entitled." '
To enable the carrier to act, the Code authorizes delivery, diver-
sion, or reconsignment by the carrier on instructions from a proper
party.'' If the bill of lading is negotiable, the proper party is the
holder, but the carrier must protect possible purchasers by noting on
the bill any change of instructions. 52 As to nonnegotiable bills, the
Code orients the carrier more toward the consignor and less toward the
consignee than prior law, permitting obedience to the consignor's in-
structions even in cases of conflicting instructions from the consignee.
145. Rountree v. Lydick-Barmann Co., 150 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) ;
Southern Express, Inc. v. T.S.C. Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 200 F.2d 797 (5th
Cir. 1952); UCC § 7-501(6).
146. Compare Hartford Distillery Co. v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 97 Conn.
1, 115 At. 488 (1921), 20 MicH. L. REv. 667 (1922), with Myers v American Ry.
Express Co., 243 Mass. 390, 137 N.E. 654, 23 COL. L. Rxv. 489 (1923). See UCC
§ 3-405 (negotiable instruments).
147. Compare UWRA §§ 9, 10, with UCC §§ 7-303, 7-403(1) (e), 7-404.
148. Cf. Levy v. Terminal Warehouse Co., 121 Pa. Super. 95, 183 Ati. 102
(1936) (negotiable receipt).
149. UBLA §§ 12, 13.
150. See, e.g., Miller v. New York Central R.R., 205 App. Div. 663, 200 N.Y.
Supp. 287 (1st Dep't 1923); Turner Lumber & Investment Co. v. Chicago, R.I. &
P. Ry., 225 Mo. App. 1002, 34 S.W.2d 1009 (1931); Southern Pac. Co. v. Agencia
Joffroy, S.A., 65 Ariz. 65, 174 P.2d 278 (1946).
151. UCC § 7-303.
152. Cf. Boatman's Nat. Bank v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 75 F.2d 494 (8th Cir.,
cert. denied, 295 U.S. 751 (1935).
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The carrier may still, as under prior law,'53 obey the consignee and take
the risk that he may not be entitled to the goods. But even in the
absence of conflicting instructions, the Code fully protects the carrier
who obeys the consignee only "if the goods have arrived at billed
destination or if the consignee is in possession of the bill." 154
Lost Documents: The requirement that a negotiable document be
surrendered when the goods are delivered causes trouble when the
document is lost or destroyed. The uniform acts authorize court
orders for delivery in such cases, to be made upon satisfactory proof
of loss or destruction and the claimant's giving of a bond approved by
the court.' Delivery without such a court order is unauthorized 15
and in the case of a warehouse receipt may even be criminal.'57 But the
Federal Bills of Lading Act provides that a voluntary indemnifying
bond without order of court shall be binding on the parties thereto, 58
and such bonds have been authorized by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission and enforced by the courts. 59 In any event, the bailee who
delivers even under court order remains liable to a bona fide holder.
The Code generally revises the prior statutes.60 The Code provi-
sion authorizes a court order for issuance of a substitute document as
well as for delivery, covers "lost, stolen or destroyed" documents, and
applies to both nonnegotiable and negotiable documents. 6' The post-
ing of security "to indemnify any person who may suffer loss as a
result of non-surrender of the document" is mandatory where the court
orders delivery under a lost document which is negotiable, discre-
tionary where the document is nonnegotiable. As under prior law, the
court may order payment of the bailee's reasonable costs and counsel
fees. The bailee may comply with the court order "without liability to
any person ;" thus for the first time the recourse of the holder is limited
to the posted security.
The Code also provides for delivery without court order. Such
delivery leaves the bailee liable to persons injured. But the Code makes
153. UBLA §§ 12, 13.
154. UCC § 7-303(1) (c).
155. UWRA § 14; UBLA § 17.
156. Orange Nat. Bank v. Southern Pac. Co., 162 La. 223, 110 So. 329 (1926);
cf. Moise v. Southern Ry., 129 S.C. 162, 123 S.E. 790 (1924).
157. UWRA § 54; see Dahl v. Winter-Truesdell-Diercks Co., 61 N.D. 84, 95,
237 N.W. 202, 206 (1931).
158. 39 STAT. 540 (1916), 49 U.S.C. §94 (1946).
159. Northwestern Casualty & Surety Co. v. Illinois Central R.R., 19 F.2d 868
(7th Cir. 1927); see Morse-Hubbard Co. v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 286 Ill. App. 163,
3 N.E.2d 93 (1936).
160. UCC § 7-601.
161. Compare United States Warehouse Act § 20, 39 STAT. 489 (1916), 7 U.S.C.
§261 (1946).
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separate and somewhat confusing provisions for liability for conver-
sion, which may arise when the claim of loss is false and at the time of
delivery the document is outstanding in the hands of someone other
than the claimant. The Code expressly imposes liability for conversion
on the bailee who delivers in bad faith and without court order; it
expressly negates such liability for a carrier which acts in good faith
pursuant to the official classification and tariff. Other cases are left
unclear. A claimant on a negotiable warehouse receipt "must post
security . . . to indemnify the warehouseman . . .," but the con-
sequences of compliance or non-compliance with that requirement are
not stated. The intent seems to be to give a warehouseman protection
from liability for conversion at least where he acts in good faith and
the required security is posted.
Conflicting Claims: Since the bailee is protected in delivering
pursuant to the document only if he acts in good faith, notice of an
adverse claim subjects him to a risk of double liability. In such cases
the Code, like prior law, does not require him to decide between con-
flicting claimants at his peril. He is given an excuse from delivering
until he has had a reasonable time to ascertain the validity of the adverse
claims or to interplead.62
IV. THE BAILEE's LIEN
Charges Covered: Section 7-209 of the Code rewrites the UWRA
provisions on warehousemen's liens; " it provides for both a specific
and a general lien. The specific lien of the warehouseman covers
charges "in relation to goods covered by the document;" it is limited
to charges subsequent to the date of issue of the warehouse receipt.
Section 7-307 extends to carriers a specific lien similar to that given
warehousemen. The carrier's lien is limited to charges subsequent to
receipt of the goods; it covers charges for storage and transportation,
including demurrage 64 and terminal charges, and expenses of preserva-
tion and of sale to satisfy the lien. The warehouse provision refers
expressly to such charges and also to insurance, labor, and "charges
present or future."
The provision for a warehouseman's general lien, covering charges
not relating to the bailment of particular goods, finds no counterpart
162. UCC §7-603; UWRA § 16, 17; UBLA §§20, 21.
163. UWRA §§27-32; compare UBLA §26 (applicable only to negotiable bills
of lading).
164. Cf. Climber Motor Corp. v. Fore, 273 S.W. 284, 288 (Tex. Civ. App.
1925). Contra, at common law: Nicolette Lumber Co. v. Peoples Coal Co., 213
Pa. 379, 62 Atl. 1060 (1906).
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for carriers, probably because carriers are commonly bound by pub-
lished charges and are not free to make special arrangements with
particular shippers. 165  It covers charges "other than those specified"
by the specific lien, "such as for money advanced and interest;" as under
the UWRA, it presumably covers storage charges on other goods,
even though surrendered before the deposit of the goods on which a lien
is later claimed."' The Code, however, introduces the requirement,
new for nonnegotiable receipts, that the maximum amount of the
charges for which a general lien is claimed be specified on the receipt.'
Apparently a statement that advances have been made for stated pur-
poses in an amount not known to the issuing agent would protect the
warehouseman from liability for damages under Section 7-202, but
would not preserve his general lien unless a "maximum amount" was
specified. Any security interest reserved by the warehouseman is also
subjected to Article 9, Secured Transactions, under which possession
without filing perfects a security interest except in field warehousing
arrangements.' Under Article 9 subsequent advances by the ware-
houseman would have priority from the time his security interest was
perfected.1
69
In the course of the consideration of the Code in Massachusetts,
some concern was reported on the part of warehousemen that a ware-
houseman might lose his specific lien by issuing a new nonnegotiable
receipt when goods in storage were sold.' To clarify this problem it
was proposed, apparently with the informal approval of the Enlarged
Editorial Board of the sponsoring organizations, to add a new comment
5 to Section 7-209. The new comment would make it clear that, when
goods stored under a nonnegotiable receipt were sold, the warehouse-
man could withhold any acknowledgment to the new owner until storage
charges were paid. Alternatively, he could preserve his lien for past
165. Cf. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Mugg, 202 U.S. 242, 245 (1906); Houston &
T.C.R.R. v. Johnson, 41 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931).
166. Compare Harbor View Marine Corp. v. Braudy, 189 F.2d 481 (1st Cir.
1951); Milford Packing Co. v. Isaacs, 90 A.2d 796 (Del. Super. 1952). But cf.
Chemical Nat. Bank v. New York Dock Co., 203 App. Div. 108, 196 N.Y. Supp.
414 (1st Dep't 1922), aff'd, 236 N.Y. 560 (1923) ; In re Taub, 7 F.2d 447 (2d Cir.
1925).
167. Accord, at common law: State Bank of Wilbur v. Almira Farmers' Ware-
house Co, 123 Wash. 354, 212 Pac. 543 (1923) ; State v. Broadwater Elevator Co.,
61 Mont. 215, 201 Pac. 687 (1921). Compare Negotiable Documents, text at notes
178-201 infra. See also UCC § 7-202(2) (e), (i), notes 40-4 mipra, extending to
nonnegotiable receipts the liability stated in UWRA § 2.
168. UCC § 9-305; see Field Warehousing, text at notes 231-42, infra.
169. UCC §§ 9-204(5), 9-312(2); cf. In re Quaker City Cold Storage Co., 138
F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1943).
170. Cf. Collins v. Kent Storage Co., 228 Mich. 137, 141-2, 199 N.W. 634, 636
(1924). Contra under the UWRA, Boas v. De Pue Warehouse Co., 69 Cal. App.
246, 230 Pac. 980 (1924).
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charges by noting on the new receipt that he reserved a security interest
for charges "since a stated date." According to the new comment, such
a notation would satisfy the requirement in the Code text of a "maxi-
mum amount specified on the receipt." The warehouseman would thus
be relieved of any necessity of computing the dollar amount of the
charges prior to issuance of the new receipt.
The warehouseman's lien under the UWRA and the carrier's
common law lien are invalid as against the owner of a paramount title;
only the owner or a person with power to pledge can subject the goods
to the lien.17' The official comment states that under the Code "the
owner must have put the depositor in control of the goods . ." 172
but that statement seems contrary to the statutory text and hence in-
valid. ' 73 According to the text, the specific lien of a warehouseman or
carrier is effective against "any person entitled to the goods unless the
[bailee] had notice that the [bailor] lacked authority to subject the
goods to such charges and expenses." Thus the Code protects the
bailee's lien, unless he has "reason to know," '-7 by permitting a wrong-
doer to encumber and even divest the title of an innocent owner. This
policy goes beyond the Code's policy of protecting a buyer in ordinary
course of business from a merchant to whom goods are "entrusted,"
for the latter policy is limited to cases where the innocent owner
acquiesces in the merchant's possessionY.5  The exceptional protection
of the bailee's lien can be partially defended on the ground that the true
owner is benefited by the preservation of his goods.' As to a security
interest for money advanced, or for other charges going beyond the
specific lien, however, a warehouseman of goods deposited without
authority is treated like other lenders. 77 Thus a prior lender on the
security of the same goods, having filed his security agreement in the
proper public office, may rely on constructive notice to subordinate the
warehouseman's general lien for money advanced; but the warehouse-
man's statutory specific lien for storage charges will prevail in the
absence of actual knowledge or "reason to know."
Negotiable Documents: The uniform acts deny the warehouseman
or carrier a lien on goods for which a negotiable document is issued,
171. UWRA §28(b); S. Jacobs & Son v. North Kensington Storage Co., 81
Pa. Super. 140 (1923); Swinson v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 117 Kan. 258, 230
Pac. 1046 (1924).
172. UCC § 7-219 comment 2.
173. Compare UCC §§7-209(3), 7-307(2) with UCC §7-209 comment 2; see
UCC § 1-102(3) (f).
174. UCC § 1-201(25), defining "notice."
175. UCC §2-403(2).
176. Cf. UCC § 9-310 comment 1; Uniform Trust Receipts Act, § 11 (specific
liens for processing, warehousing, shipping, etc.).
177. UCC §§7-209(3), 7-503; see Invalid Documents, text at notes 204-8 infra.
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except for types of charges listed in the statutes, unless the document
"expressly enumerates other charges" for which a lien is claimed,'
though the amount of the charges need not be stated. But a lien for
charges on other goods was denied when the receipt failed to disclose
that the other goods had been removed without payment before the
receipt was issued; the court said that the receipt must separately list
"each item in unmistakable terms." 179
As pointed out above, the Code requires a statement of maximum
amount of the general lien in both negotiable and nonnegotiable ware-
house receipts; 180 as to carriers it makes no grant of lien for charges not
specified in the statute.181 The Code also makes a new restriction ap-
plicable only to negotiable documents. 18 2 Unlike the prior provisions,'
8 3
which seem to invalidate the specific lien regardless of who holds the
document,8 4 the new restriction applies only "against a purchaser for
value" of the negotiable document. Against such a purchaser, the
specific lien is limited to a "reasonable charge," "s' unless the "charges"
are stated in the document, or, in the case of a carrier, in applicable
tariffs. "Charges" here seems to mean the amount rather than the type
of charge.
Enforcement: The basic right of the bailee to withhold possession
until his lien is satisfied is left by the Code to negative implication. 8
That right is lost by unjustifiable refusal to deliver or by surrender of
the goods.8 7  As under prior law, the lien might also be lost by mis-
delivery or other conversion, even though the warehouseman regained
possession in an attempt to remedy the defect; 188 but perhaps an excep-
tion might be made for involuntary surrender under court order. 89
Forfeiture of the lien, like its enforcement by sale, would seem to leave
unimpaired any contract right to recover the amount of the unpaid
178. UWRA §30; UBLA §26.
179. Metropolitan Commercial Corp. v. Larkin Co., 257 App. Div. 612, 614, 15
N.Y.S.2d 18, 20 (4th Dep't 1939), leave to appeal denied, 283 N.Y. 779 (1940).
180. See text at note 167 rupra.
181. See text at note 164 supra; cf., at common law, BAcharach v. Chester
Freight Line, 133 Pa. 414, 19 Atl. 409 (1890).
182. UCC §§ 7-209(1), 7-307(1).
183. UWRA §§ 27, 28, 30.
184. Klock Produce Co. v. Diamond Ice & Storage Co., 90 Wash. 67, 155 Pac.
414 (1916); Wilson Distilling Co. v. Foust Distilling Co., 51 F. Supp. 744 (M.D.
Pa. 1943).
185. Cf. Schenley Distillers Corp. v. Kinsey Distilling Corp., 136 F.2d 350 (3d
Cir. 1943) (lien of purchaser of bankrupt warehouse).
186. UCC § 7-403(2); see UCC § 7-209 comment 4; compare UWRA § 31.
187. UCC §§7-209(4), 7-307(3); compare UWRA §29.
188. Bernstein v. Hineman, 86 Pa. Super. 198 (1925).
189. McGann Co. v. New Jersey Novelty Footwear Co., 96 N.J.L. 481, 115
Atl. 445 (Ct. Err. & App. 1921).
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charges from the depositor; and surrender of the goods to the owner
may be consideration for his promise to pay the charges.' Con-
versely, however, if there is no indebtedness for storage charges, there
is no lien. 9 '
Like prior law, the Code contemplates enforcement of the bailee's
lien by sale,'92 and excuses the bailee from delivery to the person en-
titled under the document when such a sale has been lawfully made.
193
The section requiring that a negotiable document be surrendered on
delivery makes no exception for such cases; on its face, though prob-
ably not so intended, it would seem to render the bailee liable to a bona
fide holder, and an amendment has been proposed in Massachusetts to
make clear the nonliability of the bailee."' Under prior law a sale
not in strict compliance with the statute was a conversion 195 and prob-
ably conferred no right even on a bona fide purchaser; the Code protects
bona fide purchasers and limits the bailee's liability for conversion to
cases of willful violation. 98 In other cases the bailee is liable only for
loss resulting from the noncompliance.
The Code makes provisions for the procedure for sale by a ware-
houseman substantially similar to those made by the UWRA.
1
1
Among the changes is a requirement of notification, not necessarily
written,-9 to known claimants, instead of "written notice." The
notification must contain a demand for payment within not less than
ten days after "receipt" of the notification, and a "conspicuous" 19
statement as to the intended sale; under the UWRA the ten days ran
from delivery or from the time when the notice "should reach" its
destination by mail, and the defined term "conspicuous" is new. As
under the UWRA, the sale must be held in the "nearest suitable place"
to the warehouse and must be advertised for 15 days after the ten-day
demand has expired; until sale the goods may be redeemed. A new
provision expressly permits the warehouseman to bid at public sales.
190. Compare UCC §§ 7-210(7), 7-308(6); UWRA § 32; Mercer v. Shiver, 81
Ga. App. 815, 60 S.E.2d 263 (1950).
191. I re Hamburger Distillery, Inc., 115 F2d 84 (3d Cir. 1940) (no lien
against pledgee of receipts beneficially owned by warehouseman).
192. UCC §§ 7-210, 7-308; compare UWRA § 33.
193. UCC § 7-403(1) (c); compare UWRA § 36; UBLA § 27.
194. UCC § 7-403(3) ; see note 134 supra.
195. Hirsch v. Hubert Transfer & Storage Co., 136 Pa. Super. 605, 8 A.2d 426
(1939) ; Bernstein v. Hineman, 86 Pa. Super. 198 (1925) ; State ex rel. Kendrick v.
Amarillo Transfer & Storage Co., 94 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) ; Gulf, C. &
S.F. Ry. v. North Texas Grain Co., 32 Tex. Civ. App. 93, 74 S.W. 567 (1903).
196. UCC §§7-210(4), (5), 7-308(3), (4).
197. UCC § 7-210(2); compare UWRA § 33.
198. UCC § 1-201(26). But see note 199 infra.
199. UCC § 1-201(10), apparently requiring a writing.
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Proceeds in excess of the amount of the lien are held for the person for
whom the goods were held.
These restrictive provisions are intended to apply primarily to
storage of household goods by private owners. For "goods stored by
a merchant in the course of his business" an alternative, more flexible
procedure is newly provided; and carriers are subject only to the new
provisions.-20 A warehouseman who is in doubt whether the depositor
is a "merchant" can safely sell only under the more restrictive procedure.
The new procedure for commercial storage and for carriers per-
mits "public or private sale of the goods in bloc or in parcels, at any
time or place and on any terms which are commercially reasonable."
Known claimants must be notified of the amount due, the nature of the
sale, and the time and place of public sale. By negative implication the
bailee may bid only at a public sale. The fact that a better price could
have been obtained in another way does not "of itself" show that the
sale was not "commercially reasonable." o Sale in the usual manner
on a recognized market, or at the price current in such a market, or
conforming to commercially reasonable practices among dealers in the
type of goods sold, is "commercially reasonable." In other cases sale
of more goods than apparently necessary to insure satisfaction of the
lien is not commercially reasonable.
Termination of Storage: The Code provisions for enforcement of
the bailee's lien by sale must probably be read as limited to cases where
the bailee's claim is due and unpaid, although such a limitation is not
expressly stated. Such a reading gives meaning to the provisions of
Section 7-206 designed "to define the warehouseman's power to ter-
minate the bailment" in the standard case of warehousing for an in-
definite term. °2 Section 7-206 permits the warehouseman, without
cause, to require payment of any charges and removal of the goods, by
notifying known claimants. Where the storage is for a period fixed in
the document, no minimum period of notice is prescribed, and the
termination may take effect at the end of the period fixed. In the more
common case where no period of storage is fixed, the termination may
take effect within a stated period not less than thirty days after notifica-
tion. In either case, if the goods are not removed at the end of the
period, the warehouseman may sell under the provisions for enforce-
ment of liens. The UWRA makes no provision for such termination
at will.
200. UCC §§7-210(1), (8), 7-308(1). For a definition of "merchant," see
UCC §2-104(1), not expressly made applicable to Article 7.
201. Cf. Newton v. L. W. Culver Storage & Transfer Co., 157 S.W2d 656
(Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
202. See UCC § 7-206 comment 1.
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Section 7-206 also carries forward, revises and extends the
UWRA provision for termination of storage of perishable and hazard-
ous goods. °3 The Code provides generally for cases of impending de-
cline in value to less than the amount of the lien; in such cases the ware-
houseman may give notification of a reasonable time shorter than that
provided for termination at will, and may then sell at public sale not
less than one week after a single advertisement or posting. Apparently
the advertisement must be made after the notification time has expired.
The provision for hazardous goods is limited, as the UWRA provision
is not, to conditions of which the warehouseman had no notice at the
time of deposit; it is not limited to the hazards of odor, leakage, in-
flammability, or explosive nature listed in the UWRA, but seems to
apply to such other hazards as bacteria or insects. In hazard cases the
warehouseman may sell at public or private sale on reasonable notifica-
tion, and, if unable to sell, may dispose of the goods in any lawful
manner without liability.
V. DOCUMENTS AS SECURITY
Invalid Documents: Perhaps the primary reason for codifying the
law of title documents and certainly the main reason for the United
States Warehouse Act2 was to enhance the value of such documents
for use as collateral security for loans. A bank which advances money
against a document of title seeks a security interest in the goods covered
by the document. If a nonnegotiable document is issued directly to the
bank, or if a negotiable document is duly negotiated to it, the bank has
the purported obligation of the bailee to hold the goods. The Code,
like the uniform acts, leaves the bank subject to the risk that the bailee
and the goods are fictitious, or that the bailee is not bound because its
signature was forged or made without authority, or that the document
has been altered.
The risks of forgery and alteration are narrowed somewhat by
provisions with respect to documents issued by the bailee's agent and
with respect to the filling of blanks.205 Criminal penalties have some
deterrent effect. But bailees and their customers have not been ready
to bear the cost of elaborate protective devices like those used for cor-
porate stocks and bonds; bills of lading especially are often issued rather
loosely. One reason may be that the credit involved is commonly for
a short term; another may be that the borrower is often a regular com-
203. UWRA § 34.
204. See note 11, supra.
205. See Non-Receipt and Misdescription, text at notes 85-105 supra; Alteration,
text at notes 82-4 supra.
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mercial customer of the bank. In any event, banks often rely in part
on the honesty of the borrower when they lend against documents of
title.
Banks also rely on the credit of the bailee. The bailee's obligations
on documents issued by him are discussed above: they include an
undertaking that the goods were received before the document was
issued, a duty at least to use due care to preserve the goods, and a
promise not to deliver them to unauthorized persons. If those obliga-
tions are properly carried out, the bank has a good deal of assurance
that it has the desired security interest. Risks remain that the goods
will decline in value or will suffer damage from a cause for which the
bailee is not responsible, but the value can sometimes be protected by
hedging on a futures market and the goods can be insured against
damage."0 If the bailee does its job, the bank's security interest will
be yalid against the bailee's receiver or trustee in bankruptcy.
When the bailee fails to perform its obligations, the bank has the
liability of the bailee as a substitute for the goods it fails to get. The
bank's security then depends on the financial responsibility of the bailee.
Railroads, and other carriers to a lesser extent, commonly have re-
sources very large in proportion to claims likely to be asserted against
them for breach of their duties as bailees. This is less true of ware-
housemen, and there have been many cases where depositors and banks
have suffered loss because a warehouseman has become bankrupt and
a shortage has been found in the goods supposed to be stored with him.
Property insurance may be written broadly to cover "physical loss or
damage from any external cause, including non-delivery," but even
such insurance has been held not to cover a loss caused by the issue
of spurious warehouse receipts." 7  The financial responsibility of a
licensed warehouse is often buttressed by a requirement that a bond be
filed; the scope of the bond depends, of course, on its terms.
208
Unauthorized Bailment: In one situation the bank may have no
rights against either the goods or the bailee even though it holds a
206. See, e.g., Curacao Trading Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 137 F.2d 911 (2d Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 765 (1944); Richards, op. cit. supra note 32. As to
regulations permitting or requiring insurance to be taken out by the bailee, see, e.g.,
Dixey v. Fed. Compress & Warehouse Co., 132 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1942), 140 F.2d
820 (8th Cir. 1944) (federal licensed warehouse); Lucas v. Garrett, 209 S.C. 521,
41 S.E.2d 212 (1947) (intrastate common carrier by truck).
207. Curacao Trading Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., supra note 206.
208. See, e.g., United States Warehouse Act §6, 39 STAT. 486 (1919), as
amended, 7 U.S.C. §247 (1946) (performance "of such additional obligations as a
warehouseman as may be assumed by him under contracts with the respective de-
positors"); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Washington Loan & Banking Co., 167 Ga.
354, 145 S.E. 761 (1928) (pledgee recovers where pledgor-warehouseman issued
spurious receipts). But see First Nat. Bank of Lincoln v. Lincoln Grain Co., 116
Neb. 809, 219 N.W. 192 (1928) (semble; possession by warehouseman necessary
to validity of receipts against surety).
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document issued by him in regular course: where the goods were de-
posited by one who did not own them.2 9  This risk is narrowed some-
what by doctrines of agency and estoppel, and by the rule that a right
to rescind a transfer for fraud cannot be exercised against a bona fide
purchaser.21 Thus where a carrier issued negotiable bills of lading
before goods were received, subsequent delivery of the goods to the
carrier "fed" the bills of lading so as to protect banks to whom the bills
had been pledged, despite the fact that the shipper had bought the goods
fraudulently.
21'
The Code further narrows the occasions for defeating the title of
the document holder. Article 2 (Sales) expands the power of a mer-
chant to convey to a buyer in ordinary course; if the merchant is
entrusted with the possession of goods of a kind in which he deals,
he is given power to dispose of the rights of the entruster.212 And
as against a person to whom a negotiable document is duly negotiated,
the true owner loses his rights by entrusting goods to the bailor "with
power of disposition." 213 Taken together, these provisions seem to
go beyond the existing Factor's Acts in protecting the bona fide
pledgee.2 1' The Code protection is also extended to cases where the
true owner has "acquiesced" in the bailor's "procurement of any docu-
ment of title." 2"5 The intended result seems to be to permit the bona
fide pledgee to prevail over the holder of a prior security interest, even
though properly perfected by filing, whenever the prior secured party
has thus "acquiesced." 216
Delivery Orders; Freight-Forwarder Bills: Delivery orders and
freight-forwarder bills of lading rest in part on the credit of the issuer
as well as on the credit of the bailee-warehouseman or carrier. For, at
least until the bailee is notified, the issuer can defeat the rights of the
holder by obtaining delivery of the goods or obtaining a substitute
209. UCC §§7-403(1) (a), 7-503(1); UWRA §41; UBLA §32; Dunagan v.
Griffin, 151 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Kendall Produce Co. v. Terminal
Warehouse & Transfer Co., 295 Pa. 450, 145 Atl. 511 (1929).
210. UCC §§7-502(1) (c), 2-403(1) ; USA §23.
211. Baldwin v. Childs, 249 N.Y. 212, 163 N.E. 737 (1928).
212. UCC §§ 1-201(9), 2-403(2), (3).
213. UCC § 7-503(1).
214. Compare James v. Meriwether Graham Oliver Co., 152 Tenn. 528, 279
S.W. 390 (1925) (entrusting for sale), with Gazzola v. Lacy Bros. & Kimball, 156
Tenn. 229, 299 S.W. 1039 (1927) (entrusting for storage). Compare Pa. Laws 1834,
p. 375, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, §§ 201, 202 (Purdon Supp. 1953).
215. UCC § 7-503(1); cf. Commercial Nat. Bank of New Orleans v. Canal-
Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 239 U.S. 520 (1916). Contra: Gazzola v. Lacy Bros.
& Kimball, 156 Tenn. 229, 299 S.W. 1039 (1927) ; Decker & Sons v. Milwaukee Cold
Storage Co., 173 Wis. 87, 180 N.W. 256 (1920).
216. UCC § 7-503 comment (fifth paragraph); UCC § 9-309.
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negotiable document from the bailee.217 The official comment errone-
ously states that the Code "does not attempt to settle the title problems
which would arise as between bona fide purchasers of negotiable docu-
ments of different issuers." 218
The Code seems to make inconsistent provisions as to the time
when the rights of a holder of a delivery order become fixed as against
others than the issuer. Article 2 (Sales), like the USA, seems to make
decisive the receipt of "notification" by the bailee.2 9  But Section
7-502(1) seems clearly to deny the holder any rights against others
than the issuer until the delivery order has been "accepted" by the
bailee.' The apparent conflict should probably be resolved by limiting
the acceptance provision to delivery orders in negotiable form; but it
can be read as applying to any delivery order, or to any delivery order
issued by the holder of a negotiable document of title. Even after
acceptance, the title of the holder of the delivery order is subject to
the rights of the bona fide holder of a negotiable document issued by
the bailee."' Of course a delivery order issued by the holder of a
negotiable document could not properly be honored without surrender
of, or conspicuously noting partial deliveries on, the negotiable docu-
ment.=
In freight-forwarder cases, the Code reverses the priority.2' The
holder of a bill of lading issued by a freight forwarder prevails over
any rights based on the bill issued to the freight forwarder by the car-
rier. But the carrier is protected in compliance with the bill issued
by it. The theory is that a bill issued to a freight forwarder gives
notice on its face that the forwarder has probably issued a bill, but that
that theory should not be applied, for example, to impose less-than-car-
load-lot responsibility on a carrier which receives only carload rates.
Fungible Goods: A warehouseman must ordinarily keep separate
the goods covered by each receipt, but an exception is made for goods
217. Cf. Brock v. Atteberry, 153 La. 649, 96 So. 505 (1923) ; Comptoir d'Achat
v. de Ridder [1949] A.C. 293 (H.L.).
218. See UCC § 7-402 comment 3. This comment is based on the 1949 draft of
the Code, and became obsolete when Section 7-503(2) was added in 1950 to settle
such problems. Compare UCC § 6-105 comment 3, 6-303 (May 1949 Draft), with
UCC § 7-402 comment 3, 7-503(2) (Proposed Final Draft, Spring 1950).
219. UCC §§ 2-503(4), 7-504 (2); USA § 43(3); Brown v. National Dock &
Storage Warehouse Co., 239 Mass. 10, 131 N.E. 458 (1921) ; Peelle Co. v. Industrial
Plant Corp., 120 N.J.L. 480, 200 Atl. 1007 (1938).
220. UCC § 7-502(1).
221. UCC § 7-503(2).
222. UCC § 7-403(3) ; cf. Cundhill v. Lewis, 245 N.Y. 383, 157 N.E. 502 (1927).
223. UCC § 7-503(2) and comment; see Statement of Mr. Albert Ward, supra
note 29, at 171.
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which are treated as fungible by usage or agreement . 2 4 Fungible goods
may be commingled; although the UWRA then makes the warehouse-
man liable to each depositor "as if the goods had been kept separate," 0
it seems that the depositor must take the risk of any impairment of
quality which inevitably follows the authorized commingling." The
owners become tenants in common of the whole, and loss by accident
or misdelivery is borne pro rata, except that any claim of a wrongdoing
bailee must be subordinated. 2 7 Apparently the same result would fol-
low where the commingling was unauthorized, at least if the goods were
indistinguishable.
Where a shortage in commingled fungible goods arises from the
issue of spurious receipts for goods not received, the problem is more
difficult. If it cannot be ascertained which receipts were issued for
goods and which were not, it may be fair to make all bona fide holders
share the loss pro rata. But if it can be shown that a particular receipt
never represented any goods, it may be argued that the general rule
should apply that a second document of the same issuer, like an un-
marked duplicate, confers no right to the goods. The Code expressly
overrules that argument in cases of fungibles covered by negotiable
receipts, providing that all holders to whom overissued receipts have
been duly negotiated are entitled to share in the mass. 8 But the same
question is left open as it affects nonnegotiable receipts.
Where a warehouseman, after a shortage has arisen, adds to the
mass new goods of his own or buys from a depositor some of the goods
supposed to be included in the mass, the shortage may be held re-
duced. 2 9 In some cases the warehouseman may intend to make good
the shortage, but it seems fair to hold him to the result regardless of his
intent. The fairness is less clear if the effect is to prefer depositors over
other creditors of the warehouseman, or to defeat the title of a subse-
quent bona fide purchaser of the goods from the warehouseman.
Where the warehouseman is in the business of buying and selling
fungible goods of the kind involved, the Code protects buyers in the
ordinary course of business against such claims of receipt holders.2 °
224. UCC §§7-207, 1-201(17); UWRA §§22, 23, 24, 58. Usage may bind a
depositor ignorant of it. UCC § 1-205(3); cf. In re Heyward-Williams Co., 284
Fed. 983 (S.D. Ga. 1922).
225. UWRA § 24.
226. Allen V. Smith, Inc. v. Rosalia Producers, Inc., 36 Wash.2d 680, 219 P.2d
986 (1950).
227. McDonnell v. Bank of China, 33 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1929), cert. denied,
280 U.S. 612 (1930) ; see BRowN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 78 (1936).
228. UCC § 7-207(2) ; cf. McDonnell v. Bank of China, supra note 227.
229. Torgerson v. Quinn-Sheperdson Co., 161 Minn. 380, 201 N.W. 615 (1925);
State ex rel. Hermann v. Farmers' Elevator Co., 59 N.D. 679, 231 N.W. 725 (1930) ;
Kendall Produce Co. v. Terminal Warehouse & Transfer Co., 295 Pa. 450, 145 Atl.
511 (1929).
230. UCC § 7-205(1); compare UCC § 2-403(2). Contra: Kimball Milling Co.
v. Greene, 141 Tex. 84, 170 S.W2d 191 (1943).
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In one situation the rule of pro rata sharing seems unsound.
Where a shortage has already arisen, a depositor who delivers the full
amount of goods for which a receipt is issued to him should not be held
as a matter of law to have made an involuntary contribution to make up
the loss already suffered by previous depositors. Considerations of
convenience may justify the placing of the burden of proof on one who
makes such a claim, and the claim will often fail because of the difficulty
of proof. But the Code does not clearly foreclose it.
Field Warehousing: In many states the law has made it difficult
or impossible to create a valid security interest in a shifting stock of
goods."m ' If the borrower is a licensed public warehouseman, he may
be able to create a valid pledge of his own goods by issuing receipts for
them, and if the goods are properly kept separate the pledge may with-
stand attack by creditors of the warehouseman and purchasers from
him." But if the pledgor is not a licensed warehouseman, or if the
goods are not properly identified, the transfer to the pledgee may be a
fraud on creditors or may leave the pledgor with power to transfer a
valid title to a bona fide purchasert m3
To avoid such risks, the device of "field warehousing" was de-
vised.284 A "warehouse" is created on the borrower-owner's premises,
leased to an independent licensed warehouseman. One of the bor-
rower's employees is put on the warehousemen's payroll and covered
by a fidelity bond, and put in charge of the "warehouse," which may be
anything from a separate warehouse building to a chicken-wire en-
closure. Signs are posted to disclose the situation, and warehouse
receipts are issued against goods deposited in the warehouse. If the
formalities are duly observed so that the warehouseman maintains
"actual, open and exclusive possession," 235 the pledgee of such receipts
is protected against those claiming under the pledgor, but mingling
231. See Cohen and Gerber, Mortgages of Merchandise, 39 COL. L. RE-v. 1338
(1939) ; Cohen and Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause, 87 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 635 (1939).
232. Michigan City Bank v. First State Bank of Manvel, 51 N.D. 757, 201 N.W.
176 (1924) ; compare notes 33-6 supra; McDonnell v. Bank of China, supra note 227.
Such receipts are not acceptable collateral for rediscount with Federal Reserve
Banks. 4 Fia. RES. BULL. 31 (1918).
233. USA §§ 25, 26: UCC §§ 2-402, 2-403 (2) ; compare In re Enterprise Foundry
Co., 37 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Ill. 1941); Continental Can Co. v. Jessamine Canning
Co., 286 Ky. 365, 150 S.W.2d 922 (1941). But cf. Taney v. Penn National Bank
of Reading, 232 U.S. 174 (1914) (government-bonded distiller's warehouse).
234. See Friedman, Field Warehousing, 42 COL. L. REv. 991 (1942) ; Birnbaum,
Form and Substance in Field Warehousing, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 579 (1948) ;
Note, 133 A.L.R. 203 (1941). As to the duty of the borrower to the warehouseman,
see Owens v. William H. Banks Warehouses, Inc., 202 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1953).
235. Pittman v. Union Planters Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 118 F.2d 211, 214
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 632 (1941).
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with other goods of the pledgor or failure to maintain control will defeat
the pledgee's property in the goods.23
The Code provides for security interests in inventory without the
intervention of a warehouseman; such interests must be perfected by
filing to be valid against the borrower's creditors."7 The Code also
provides for perfection without filing where the goods are in the pos-
session of the lender or of a bailee,3 s but filing is required for "a field
warehousing or similar arrangement." " The filing requirement is a
simple one,2" and filing protects the lender against claims that the
warehouse was invalid, for example, because the signs were inadequate.
The Code requirement of filing applies only to "any security in-
terest" resting on the transfer of a warehouse receipt, where the goods
are on premises which are either part of the place of business of the
depositor, or within his premises, or substantially contiguous thereto.
Thus failure to file does not impair the rights of an outright buyer of
the goods who takes delivery by way of receipt. But failure to file will
subordinate a pledgee to bona fide purchasers, to lien creditors without
notice, and, perhaps most important, to the pledgor's trustee in
bankruptcy.
241
The effect of the new filing requirement is that a bank lending
money on the faith of warehouse receipts must ascertain at its peril
whether a field warehouse is involved. There is no requirement that
that question be answered on the receipt, but the bank can normally
determine the answer readily. Even if it cannot, it may be safe in
relying on the representations of the pledgor or the warehouseman, on
whose credit warehouse receipts must rest in other respects. Bankers
seem not to have objected to this filing requirement; but there has been
opposition to the Code from the Merchandise Division of the American
Warehousemen's Association which may rest in part on fear of field-
warehouse companies that they will lose a competitive advantage over
other forms of inventory security. As the official comment points out,
however, field warehousing will retain its value as a stock-control
236. Ibid; cf. Heffron v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n, 113
F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1940) ; Bradley v. St. Louis Terminal Warehouse Co., 189 F.2d
818 (8th Cir. 1951); Barry v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 190 F.2d 433 (9th Cir.
1951); In re Wyoming Valley Collieries Co., 29 F. Supp. 106 (M.D. Pa. 1939).
As to the liability of the warehouseman and his surety, see William H. Banks Ware-
houses, Inc. v. Jean, 96 F. Supp. 731 (D. Idaho 1951), affirmed per curiam sub
noan. William H. Banks Warehouses, Inc. v. Watt, 196 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1952),
vacated, 345 U.S 932, rehearing denied, 205 F.2d 44, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 825
(1953).
237. UCC §§ 9-204, 9-205, 9-301, 9-302.
238. UCC § 9-305(1).
239. UCC §§ 7-205(2), 9-305(2) and comment 4.
240. UCC §§9-401(1), 9-402.
241. UCC § 9-301.
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device, giving protection against carelessness or fraud of the borrower,
so far as that value rests on practical business needs rather than on
technical legal rules.2"
Nonnegotiable Documents: The pledge of a nonnegotiable docu-
ment to a bank named in the document as the person to whom the goods
are to be delivered may give the bank a valid claim against the issuer,
and may be adequate to transfer to the bank a security interest to the
extent of the pledgor's property in the goods, but the document does not
effectively represent the goods.243 A transfer of such a document con-
fers on the transferee only such rights as the transferor has or has
actual authority to convey; and, until the bailee receives notice of the
transfer, it may be defeated by dealings between the transferor and the
bailee or between the transferor and bona fide purchasers, or, in some
cases, by creditors of the transferor.2 44 Notification of the bailee, how-
ever, may give the transferee much the same rights as if the document
had originally been issued to him.
It has long been recognized that it is a dangerous practice to ad-
vance money on straight bills of lading.2 45 Not only is the carrier au-
thorized to deliver the goods to the consignee without surrender of the
bill, but the bank may be denied recovery against the carrier for issuing
the bill without receiving any goods.4 ' A pledge of a straight bill
may, however, give the pledgee some rights beyond those against the
pledgor. The title of a consignee from whom payment is due or de-
manded on delivery of documents of title, under the Code, is conditional
on his making the payment,24 and the pledgee may be able to assert
the pledgor's title when that condition is broken. Under the Code the
pledgor's title might be defeated by a resale by the consignee to a bona
fide purchaser,24 but the pledgee, like the pledgor, might then have a
claim to the proceeds. Moreover, it would seem that the pledgee, on
notifying the carrier, would have the power given to the consignor by
242. See UCC § 9-305 comment 4; compare Birnbaum, Article 9-A Restate-
met and Revision. on Chattel Security, [1952] Wis. L. REv. 348, 365-6.
243. UCC § 2-505(1) (b); see Edward L. Eyre & Co. v. Hirsch, 36 Wasb.2d
439, 453, 218 P.2d 888, 896 (1950); Twohig v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 118
F. Supp. 322, 327 (N.D. Iowa 1954); compare notes 227-9, 232-3 supra.
244. UCC § 7-504(1), (2) ; UWRA §§ 39, 42; UBLA §§ 30, 33; compare notes
217-9 supra.
245. See 1 PATON, DIGEST OF LEGAL. OPINIONS 710 (1940).
246. See notes 92-5 supra.
247. UCC §§ 2-507(2), 2-505(1) (b) ; Rubber Corp. of America v. Brooks Tire
& Battery Co., 45 S.D. 254, 186 N.W. 953 (1922); Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v.
First Nat. Bank, 150 Ore. 172, 38 P.2d 48, 43 P.2d 1078 (1935) ; cf. Moore &
Sinnott v. Louisiana Nat. Bank, 44 La. Ann. 99, 10 So. 407 (1892).
248. UCC §§ 2-401 (1) (b), 2-403, 2-702(1) (b). But see Weyerhaeuser Timber
Co. v. First Nat. Bank, supra note 247.
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the Code to divert the goods or change the shipping instructions.249
Wrongful exercise of that power might make the pledgee liable to the
consignee; but the carrier would be protected, and a buyer in ordinary
course would get a good title.Y0
The pledgee of a straight bill of lading attached to a draft might
have additional rights. The Code provides that a financing agency
which makes advances against a draft "which relates to a shipment
of goods" acquires the shipper's right to have the draft honored by
the buyer.25' That provision in effect makes an exception to the rule
that a draft of itself is not an assignment, and makes the financing
agency an assignee of the shipper's right to the price. As an assignee,
it should prevail without filing over the shipper's creditors or subse-
quent assignees. 2
Due Negotiation: The rights of the transferee of a negotiable
document, in the absence of "due negotiation," are much like those of a
transferee of a nonnegotiable document: the transferee gets the rights
which the transferor had or had actual authority to convey.M The
negotiable document does stand in the place of the goods, since the
bailee may not safely deliver them to other claimants under the docu-
ment so long as the transferee retains possession of the document.2
4
Thus where a seller pledges to a bank a bill of lading consigning the
goods to the order of the buyer, no one but the bank can get the goods.
But the bank is not a "holder" " and may not receive the protection of
doctrines of apparent authority, estoppel, and the like, which are avail-
able to bona fide purchasers of the goods and to persons to whom a
negotiable document is duly negotiated. Nor is such a bank a "per-
son entitled under the document," to whom the carrier is bound to
deliver.258 The bank may therefore have difficulty in realizing upon its
security interest.
"Negotiation" of a document running to bearer or indorsed in
blank is accomplished by delivery, meaning voluntary transfer of pos-
249. See note 151 stpra; UCC § 7-504(1).
250. UCC §§ 7-303 comment 2, 7-504(3).
251. UCC § 2-506(1). See George F. Hinrichs, Inc. v. Standard Trust & Sav-
ings Bank, 279 Fed. 382 (2d Cir. 1922); cf. First Nat. Bank of McClusky, N.D.
v. Rogers-Amundson-Flynn Co., 151 Miun. 243, 186 N.W. 575 (1922); Pennsylvania
R.R. v. Edson Bros., 92 Pa. Super. 496 (1927). Contra: City Nat. Bank of
Clinton, Iowa v. West Virginia Farm Bureau Service Co., 109 W. Va. 158, 153
S.E. 300 (1930).
252. UCC § 9-302(1) (e).
253. See note 244 supra.
254. UCC § 2-505(1) (a); Babbitt v. Grand Trunk Western Ry., 285 Ill. 267,
120 N.E. 803 (1918) ; see notes 129-41 srupra.
255. UCC § 1-201(20).
256. UCC § 7-403(4).
257. See 1 PATON, DIGEST OF LEGAL OPii Nos 711 (1940).
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session; an order document not so indorsed is negotiated by indorse-
ment and delivery. 58 When a bailor delivers to a bank a document
running to the bank's order, the effect is the same as that of negotiation.
Apparently special indorsement of a document in bearer form will make
necessary the further indorsement of the special indorsee, but this point
is not made crystal clear.
259
After "negotiation" the transferee is a "holder," a "person en-
titled under the document;" he may require delivery from the bailee.
The bailee is protected in such delivery if made in good faith.26° Thus
a thief or a finder may defeat the rights of the owner against the bailee
if the document is in bearer form or is indorsed in blank; to protect
himself against such defeat the owner must withhold a necessary in-
dorsement. A forged indorsement is of course ineffective. A trans-
feree is given a specifically enforceable right to have his transferor
supply any necessary indorsement, but negotiation takes place only
when it is supplied.26 That right was limited by the prior statutes to
cases of transfer "for value," "unless a contrary intention appears;"
the official comment indicates that the Code provision is not intended
to be so limited." That provision seems not to help the transferee
whose transferor has no power to indorse, such as the bank which
receives from a seller a bill of lading running to the buyer's order.
The bona fide purchaser of a negotiable document, other than the
bailee, gets the full protection given by the Code only if he takes by
"due negotiation," although a bailee is protected if he delivers in good
faith to one to whom the document was not "duly negotiated." 263
Once due negotiation is found, the bona fide purchaser takes free not
only of prior equities but also of prior legal interests based on the
document: a thief can confer a good title on one to whom the document
is duly negotiated.264 The phrase "duly negotiated" appeared in the
prior statutes,?65 but the Code for the first time defines it expressly.266
The Code definition includes the requirements of "value" and "good
258. UCC §§7-501(1), (2), 1-201(14); UWRA §§37-40; UBLA §§28-31.
But cf. John S. Hale & Co. v. Beley Cotton Co., 154 Tenn. 689, 290 S.W. 994 (1927)
("upon return of this receipt properly indorsed" controlled "bearer" document).
259. UCC § 7-501(3) ; compare UCC § 3-204(1) and comment 2. But see UCC
§ 7-501(1), (2) (a).
260. UCC §§ 7-501(4), 7-404; see notes 128, 135 supra.
261. UCC § 7-506; UWRA § 43; UBLA § 34.
262. UCC § 7-506, comment Changes; but see UCC § 1-102(3) (e), permitting
contrary agreement.
263. UCC §§ 7-501(4), 7-404.
264. UCC § 7-502; compare UWRA §§ 40, 47, and amendments recommended
in 1922; UBLA §§ 31, 38.
265. UWRA § 41; UBLA § 32.
266. UCC § 7-501(4).
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faith" which were fairly implied in the prior provisions; but value is
redefined, good faith is made to include "observance of reasonable
commercial standards," and negotiation is not "duly" made if it is
established that it is not "in the current course of business or financing."
The redefinition of "value" seems to make clear what was fairly
intended by the prior statutes, that a bank or other purchaser gives
value for a document when it extends "immediately available credit"
or makes some other executory promise sufficient to support a simple
contract,267 when it takes the document in payment of or as security
for an antecedent debt, or when it takes it pursuant to a preexisting
contract for purchase.32  Section 7-501 (4) of the Code incorporates
"reasonable commercial standards" into the concept of "good faith"
and is thus in form contrary to prior law 269 and stricter than the
minimum standard required by the Code, which make honesty the test
irrespective of negligence; 270 but it may be in accord with decisions
denying protection to a purchaser who had "notice" from facts putting
him on inquiry.
27 1
The concept of "current course," new in the Code, is expounded
at length in the official comment.272  The comment refers to cases of
negotiation by a tramp or professor or at a price suspiciously below the
market as "obviously" out of current course; a factor's wrongful pledge
of his principal's goods to secure his own preexisting bank debt is stated
flatly not to be a due negotiation. Such statements suggest that the
stated result is required as a matter of law, but litigation will be re-
quired to settle the question how far such a requirement is consistent
with the statutory text. The text is open to the interpretation that
what is in "current course" is a question for the trier of fact, with the
burden of persuasion on the party attacking the negotiation. In that
view, the comment might be taken merely as indicating the kind of
proof needed to raise a question for the trier of fact.
Attachment: The fact that a nonnegotiable document is outstand-
ing does not prevent creditors of the bailor from seizing the goods under
legal process.27 Goods subject to a nonnegotiable document are also
267. UCC § 7-102(1) (g) ; UWRA §58(1) ; UBLA §53(1) ; Commercial Sav-
ings Bank of Grand Rapids, Mich. v. Mann, 206 App. Div. 297, 200 N.Y. Supp.
587 (4th Dep't 1923); see 3 WmLsTox, SALES § 620 (Rev. ed. 1948). Contrast
UCC § 3-303 (a) ; NEGoTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 54.
268. Cf. Baldwin v. Childs, 249 N.Y. 212, 163 N.E. 737 (1928).
269. UWRA §58(2) ; UBLA §53(2).
270. UCC § 1-201(19) and comment 19.
271. See 3 WI.LIsTON, SALES § 621 (Rev. ed. 1948) ; cf. Shaw v. R.R., 101 U.S.
557 (1879) ("reason to believe").
272. UCC § 501 comment 1.
273. Edward L. Eyre & Co. v. Hirsch, 36 Wash.2d 439, 218 P.2d 888 (1950).
See notes 244, 252 supra.
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subject to a seller's right to stop delivery, which is expanded beyond
cases of the buyer's insolvency by the Code.274 Such attachment or
stoppage cannot, however, impair the rights of a person to whom a
negotiable document is duly negotiated." 5 To protect both the holder
and the bailee, the Code follows prior law in providing that goods
subject to a negotiable document cannot be attached unless the docu-
ment is surrendered or its negotiation enjoined, and that the bailee is
not obliged to deliver the goods until the document is surrendered.70
Indeed, the Code goes beyond the prior law by freeing the bailee under a
negotiable document of all obligation to obey a notice to stop until sur-
render of the document.177 The Code omits the afirmative authoriza-
tion for equitable jurisdiction by injunction in aid of attachment found
in the prior statutes, but without apparent change in result.
278
Liability of Tndorser: Banks often advance money against nego-
tiable instruments to which documents of title are attached as security.
One very common type of transaction involves a draft with bill of
lading attached, drawn by the seller-pledgor and naming the buyer-
consignee as drawee. Banks often undertake to collect such docu-
mentary drafts, and the UBLA contained provisions governing the
duties of the collecting banks.27 9  Such provisions are omitted from
Article 7 of the Code, but are included in other articles.280 The UBLA
section on the form of the bill as indicating rights of buyer and seller
is similarly transferred to Article 2."' But the obligation incurred by
a collecting bank as an indorser or transferor of a document of title is
covered in Article 7.
The indorser of a bill of lading or a warehouse receipt does not
become liable for any default by the bailee or by previous indorsers.1
2
But an indorser of a delivery order may undertake that it will be hon-
ored by the bailee; m and one who transfers a document for value
ordinarily warrants its genuineness, his own good faith, and title to
the document and the goods.284 An exception is made for "a collecting
274. UCC §§7-303(1)(d), 7-403(1)(d), 2-705; USA §§57-9; UWRA §9;
UBLA § 12. Compare notes 148-52 supra.
275. UCC § 7-502(2); USA § 62; UWRA §§ 11, 12; but compare UBLA §14,
15; see note 133 supra.
276. UCC § 7-602; USA §§ 39, 59(2) ; UWRA § 25; UBLA f, 24, 42; Pottash
v. Albany Oil Co., 274 Pa. 384, 118 At. 317 (1922).
277. UCC § 2-705(3) (c); compare USA § 59(2).
278. USA § 40; UWRA §26; UBLA § 25.
279. UBLA § 41.
280. UCC §§ 2-514, 3-701 through 3-704.
281. UBLA § 40; see USA § 20; UCC § 2-505.
282. UCC §7-505; USA § 37; UWRA §45; UBLA §36.
283. UCC § 7-505 comment.
284. UCC § 7-507; USA §36; UWRA §44; UBLA §35.
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bank or other intermediary" known to be acting for another or to be
collecting a claim against delivery of documents; such an intermediary
warrants "only its own good faith and authority." 28
That exception is designed to render unnecessary the elaborate in-
dorsement clauses used by some banks to disclaim responsibility for the
genuineness of the document or the condition of the goods.28 In the
absence of such clauses, there has been conflict of decision under the
prior statutes.287 The Code states that the exception applies even
though the intermediary has purchased a claim secured by the docu-
ment, but presumably outright purchase of the document itself would
deprive the bank of the status of "intermediary." 28 A bank might
also lose the benefit of the exception by making express representations
as to the document. 289
VI. CONCLUSION
This summary indicates that Article 7 of the Code will make sig-
nificant changes in the law of Pennsylvania and of any other state which
adopts it. Its impact will be felt primarily in the warehousing and
transportation industries, secondarily in the field of banking. Buyers
and sellers of merchandise will be directly affected more sporadically,
but may reap the principal long-run benefits to the extent that the Code
improves the bankable quality of documents of title.
Other articles of the Code will also have important effects on the
law of documents of title. Questions as to the compliance or non-
compliance of particular documents with the terms of a contract for sale
or the conditions of a letter of credit are left to Article 2 (Sales) and
Article 5 (Documentary Letters of Credit), respectively. The duties
of banks collecting documentary drafts are governed by Article 3 (Com-
mercial Paper) and Article 4 (Bank Deposits and Collections). The
use of documents of title as security for loans is covered in Article 9
(Secured Transactions). Although occasional cross-references to other
articles have been made, their provisions are beyond the general scope
of this paper.
285. UCC § 7-508; compare UWRA § 46; UBLA § 37.
286. See, e.g., Am. State Bank v. Mueller Grain Co., 15 F2d 899 (7th Cir.
1926), reversed on other grounds, 275 U.S. 493 (1927); Johnston v. Western
Maryland Ry., 151 Md. 422, 135 Atl. 185 (1926).
287. Compare Bank of Italy v. Colla, 118 Ohio St. 459, 161 N.E. 330 (1928),
with Am. Nat. Bank of Lawton v. J. Rosenbaum Grain Co., 148 Okla. 232, 299
Pac. 447 (1931).
288. Cf. Bishop & Co. v. Midland Bank, Inc., 84 F2d 585 (9th Cir. 1936),
cert. denied, 299 U.S. 587 (1936).
289. Cf. Archibald & Lewis Co. v. Banque Internat. de Commerce, 216 App.
Div. 322, 214 N.Y. Supp. 366 (1st Dep't 1926).
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When Article 7 is compared with the prior law, as has been done
here, it is apparent that the continuity with prior law is more significant
than the changes are. Terminology is recast; disputed questions are
resolved; and some innovations are introduced. But the overall picture
is one of tidying up traditional concepts rather than of radical reform.
Some initial confusion may be anticipated, and some sorrow on the
part of experts who are forced to reeducate themselves under the new
regime; but it seems likely that progress has been made without exces-
sive cost.
